The jurisdictional conflict between labour and civil courts in labour matters : a critical discussion on the prevention of forum shopping by Mathiba, Marcus Kgomotso
THE JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN LABOUR AND CIVIL COURTS IN 



















 submitted in accordance with the requirements for 
































I, MARCUS KGOMOTSO MATHIBA declare that: THE JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT 
BETWEEN LABOUR AND CIVIL COURTS IN LABOUR MATTERS: A CRITICAL 
DISCUSSION ON THE PREVENTION OF FORUM SHOPPING is my own work and 
that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged 














All praises go to the Lord, Jesus Christ, for His everlasting love and grace. Without His 
presence in my life, I would not have ventured this far. 
 
I am indebted to a number of people, who played various important roles in my journey 
towards the completion of this piece of work: 
 
Professor Adriette Dekker, you have always shown interest and belief in my work. 
Indeed, I could not have asked for a better mentor. 
 
Freddy Mnyongani, thanks for always making time to guide me. 
 
David Letsoalo, thank you for thoroughly working on my drafts. Your incisive editing has 
truly added value to my work. 
 
I am also grateful to Frans Mahlobogwane and Johannes Magoro for their unconditional 
support. 
 
Special thanks go to my parents, Aaron and Elizabeth Mathiba, for always being there 
for me when I needed them. My siblings, Eddie and Robert, as well as my cousin, 
Kabelo, have been extremely supportive. 
SUMMARY OF THESIS 
 
THE JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN LABOUR AND CIVIL COURTS IN 
LABOUR MATTERS: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION ON THE PREVENTION OF FORUM 
SHOPPING 
 
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides an elaborate dispute resolution system 
which seeks to resolve disputes in a speedy and cost-effective manner. However, this 
system is faced with a number of challenges. The application of common law and 
administrative law causes tension between the Labour Court and civil courts. It creates 
uncertainty in the development of our labour law jurisprudence and also leads to the 
problem of forum shopping. These problems in effect undermine the objectives of the 
Act. 
 
This dissertation analyzes problems in the LRA and other legislations leading to forum 
shopping. It also analyses the view of the courts on this problem and further expounds a 
number of possible solutions. The analysis revolves mainly around an observation of 




 Administrative Law 
 Common Law 
 Concurrent Jurisdiction 
 Civil Court 
 Exclusive Jurisdiction 
 Forum Shopping 
 High Court 
 Jurisdiction 
 Labour Court 
 Superior Courts Bill 
AUTHOR’S NOTES: 
 
The law is as at 31 January 2012. 
Summary of dissertation has been limited to 150 words in order to comply with 
prescribed requirement. 
1. Unless stated to the contrary, reference to “Sections” will mean provisions of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
2. The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 will be referred to as “the LRA”, whereas 
references to the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 will be “the LRA, 1956”. 
3. The masculine includes the feminine and vice versa. 
4. “Bill” refers to the Superior Courts Bill [B-2003].   
      5. “Labour Courts” refers to both the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court. 
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This study focuses on the jurisdictional tension that exists between the civil and labour 
courts. It is crucial that this tension be resolved. A key complicating factor is the 
existence of forum shopping, which has a negative impact on the independence and 
standing of the Labour Court and all other institutions created in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (The LRA). The pending Superior Courts Bill, which proposes 
the abolition of the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court, creates the need for the 
tension to be resolved. According to the Bill, labour matters are to be decided by the 
High Court whilst labour appeals will be attended to by the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
 
It is imperative that the reasons for the existence of the jurisdictional tension be 
determined before it can be effectively resolved. In this process, the original intent of the 
drafters of the LRA will have to be explored. It will further be essential that the reasons 
for, and the extent of, the conflict between labour and civil courts as far as jurisdiction is 
concerned, be thoroughly investigated. The research will finally offer recommendations 




The resolution of unfair dismissal disputes under the former Labour Relations Act1 was 
complex, inefficient, protracted, expensive and highly legalistic. This state of affairs was 
to some extent informed by the status of the Industrial Court.2 The functions of the 
                                               
1 Act 28 of 1956. 
2 Section 1 of  the former Labour Relations  Act mentions as one of its aims, “ the creation of structures 




Industrial Court were enumerated in Section 17 of the former LRA.3 The Industrial Court 
was not a court of law and its decisions were appealable in the Supreme Court. In SA 
Technical Officials’ Association v President of the Industrial Court & Others4 the (then) 
Appellate Division held that the identity of the court (Industrial Court) could not be 
determined exclusively by the nature of the functions it performed. Accordingly, the fact 
that the former LRA empowered the Industrial Court to perform all the functions that a 
court of law may perform did not make it (the Industrial Court) a court of law.5 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the court, amongst other factors, considered the 
composition of the Industrial Court. Accordingly, members of this court were appointed 
only on the basis of their knowledge of labour law.6 Same applied to additional 
members and all members of the court (including the president and deputy president), 
who were appointed for such periods as the Minister (of Manpower) could determine.7 
The Industrial Court could also consult and consider any relevant information furnished 
by specified boards or any state department or any similar authority in terms of Section 
17(20). The status of the Industrial Court was further weakened by the Minister of 
Manpower‟s authority to approve of the correction of an omission or error, or the 
clarification of any provision in the determination made by the Court.8 The Court 
frowned upon the idea of a court of law consulting with state departments and other 
                                               
3 Section 17(11) of the Act reads as follows: 
„(11) The functions of the industrial court shall be- 
(a) to perform all the functions, excluding the adjudication of alleged offences, which a court of 
law may  perform in regard to a dispute or matter arising out of the application of the provisions of 
the laws administered by the department of Manpower Utilization; 
(b) to decide any appeal lodged with it in terms of Section 21A; 
(bA) to consider and give a decision on any application made to it for an order under section 43; 
(c) to conduct arbitrations referred to it in terms of Section 45, 46 or 49; 
(d) to advise the Minister on any matter contemplated in Section 46(7)(c); 
(e) to determine any question referred to it in terms of Section 76 or 77; 
(f) to make determinations in terms of Section 46; 
(g) to deal with any other matter which it is required or permitted to deal with under this Act; and  
(h) generally to deal with all matters necessary or incidental to the performance of its functions 
under this Act.‟                                                           
4(1985) 6 ILJ 186 (A).  
5 At par 190 C-D. 
6 Section 17(1)(b). Members of this court did not have to be Judges or advocates or persons with 
specialised knowledge of  labour law. 
7 Section 17(1)(b) and (c). 
8 See Section 49(2)(a) of the Act. 
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bodies. That practice was held to be incompatible with the procedure in the superior 
courts. The uncertainty of tenure of members of the Industrial Court was also found not 
to be compatible with the independence enjoyed by judges in the superior courts. The 
court therefore concluded that the legislature, by establishing the Industrial Court in 
terms of the LRA, did not intend to equate it with a court of law.9  
 
The Labour Appeal Court was not an apex court in labour matters either, as much as 
the then Appellate Division was in civil matters. Moreover, the Appellate Division had 
powers to hear appeals with regard to the decisions of the Labour Appeal Court, 
resulting in protracted, complicated and costly litigation of labour disputes.10 With the 
challenges and weaknesses of the former LRA and its dispute-resolution system, arose 
a need to establish tailor-made institutions that would function separately from the 
ordinary courts.11 Van Eck12 mentions the following as justification of the resolution 
system subsequent to the one under  the 1956 LRA: 
 
 Expeditious finalisation of labour disputes: Lengthy appeals should be avoided. 
 Cost-effective processes: Employees are in a weaker financial position than 
employers and this financial burden can be eased by the introduction of 
                                               
9 See the decision of Franklin J in Vereniging van Bo-grondse Mynamptenare van Suid Afrika v President 
of the Industrial Court & Others 1983 (1) SA 1143 (T). At 1151 D he held that in making a determination 
under Section 17(11)(f) of the then LRA, the Industrial Court does not sit as a court of law and its 
proceedings and orders are reviewable by the Supreme Court. He relied on the decision of the Appellate 
Division in Genturico AG v Firestone SA (Pty)(Ltd) 1972 (1) SA 589 (A) which compared the provisions of 
the former LRA with those of the Patents Act 37 of 1952 which established the Commissioner of Patents. 
Accordingly, the status of the Commissioner of Patents and the force of its decisions were clearly set out 
in the Patents Act. For instance, Section 82(2) states that the commissioner has to be a trained and 
qualified  lawyer and his function is to sit as a Court to adjudicate in all disputes concerning patents 
arising from opposition to their being granted, and their infringement, revocation, extension, amendment, 
etc. The former LRA did not have such provisions. It did not have an n express provision equating the 
Industrial Court with the Local or Provincial Division of the Supreme Court. Neither has it impliedly 
equated the Industrial Court with a Superior Court.  
10 In Betha v BTR Sarmcol (A division of BTR Dunlop Ltd) 1998 ILJ 549 (SCA), it took 13 years to have a 
final determination of the matter. In another example, Chevron Engineering (Pty) (Ltd) v Nkambule (2004) 
3 BLLR 214 (SCA) took 10 years to reach finality. This matter, involving the dismissal of 124 workers for 
participation in an unlawful strike, was commenced in March 1995 and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
made its final determination in June 2003. 
11 See Van Eck: “The Constitutionalisation of labour law: No place for a superior labour appeal court in 
labour matters (Part 1): Background to South African Labour Courts and the Constitution.” (2005) 26 
Obiter 549 for an exposition of countries that use a specialised court system to resolve labour disputes 




processes that allow employees to represent themselves or to be represented by 
trade union representatives or employee organisations. 
 Accessibility of dispute resolution institutions: This accessibility is most facilitated 
by the absence of formal and technical arguments and simplification of 
procedures. 
 The involvement of specialists in employer/employee relations to consider and 
determine labour disputes. 
 Specialised institutions having exclusive jurisdiction to help develop a uniform 
and coherent labour law principles. 
 
These aspirations of a specialised system found their manifestation in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Draft Labour Relations Bill.13 Of the conciliation procedures under 
the 1956 Act, the Memorandum stated:  
 
The existing statutory conciliation procedures are not user friendly. Successful 
navigation through them requires a sophistication and expertise beyond the 
reach of most individuals and small business. Errors made in the initiation of 
conciliation procedures are often fatal to an applicant‟s claim for relief. The merits 
of the dispute often get lost in a thicket of procedural technicalities. In order for 
conciliation and alternative dispute resolution to function effectively it is essential 
that the primary thrust of procedures is to address the merits. A failure to do so 
leads workers and employers to resort to other methods to resolve disputes.14 
 
And of the adjudication system, the following observation was made: 
 
There are fundamental problems with the court system for the adjudication of 
labour relations. The Industrial Court is positioned outside the hierarchy of the 
judiciary. It lacks status. It does not provide a career path for its members or its 
                                               
13 (1995)16 ILJ 278. This is a document drafted by the Legal Task Team appointed in 1994 by the 
Minister of Labour, in consultation with employer and trade union representatives from the National 
Manpower Commission (NMC).    
14 Ibid at 326. 
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administrative staff. They have no security of tenure and their remuneration 
bears no relation to either market related or judicially related packages. The 
processes within the Industrial Court and appeals from this court to the LAC and 
the then Appellate Division all result in lengthy delays in the resolution of 
disputes in an area where speedy resolution of disputes is at a premium.15  
 
The issue of overlapping and competing jurisdiction was also undesirable because it 
hindered the development of a coherent and developing jurisprudence in labour 
relations, more so because neither the Industrial Court nor the LAC had exclusive 
jurisdiction over labour matters. It is, however, heart-warming and at the same time 
disconcerting to learn that the efforts of the Legal Task Team addressed the issues, but 
eventually generated more problems. The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, with all its 
dispute resolution processes and institutions (as outlined in chapter one thereof) is 
successful but at the same time not without challenges. 
 
1.3 The New Dispensation 
 
The term “jurisdiction” refers to the power or competence of a court to hear and 
determine an issue between parties.16 Section 34 of the Constitution17 provides that 
everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of the 
law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum. The Constitution further tasks the organs of 
state with the responsibility of ensuring, through legislative and other measures, the 
accessibility of the courts.18 
 
In labour law, this has been done through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995 (hereafter the LRA). The LRA has established the following dispute resolution 
                                               
15 Ibid. 
16 Graaff-Reinet Municipality v Van Ryneveld’s Pass Irrigation Board 1950 (2) SA 420 (A). 
17 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
18 Section 34. 
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institutions: the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA),19 
Bargaining and Statutory Councils,20 the Labour Court,21 and the Labour Appeal 
Court.22 This system of dispute resolution announced a move away from the dispute 
resolution mechanisms of the previous LRA23 which revolved around the Industrial 
Court.  
 
Du Toit24, like Van Eck above, regards the following as reasons for implementing a 
special dispute resolution system: 
 (a) The need to create a legal framework in which employers, trade unions and 
employees would be able to regulate conflict and resolve disputes; 
 (b) the need to establish a simple, non-technical and non-jurisdictional approach to 
dispute resolution; 
 (c) the need to overcome the lengthy delays inherent in the Industrial Court procedure  
and 
 (d) the need to reduce the level of strike action existed.  
 
These reasons are in line with Section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA which aims to promote the 
“effective resolution of labour disputes”. The system also aims to be easily accessible 
and affordable.  
 
Although there are specialised courts and institutions, the phenomenon of forum 
shopping has also surfaced in this field. Forum shopping refers to a tendency amongst 
litigants of exhausting different remedies or approaching different courts in respect of 
the same cause of action. For example where, the source of a dispute is administrative 
law or the common law (for instance in the case of a fixed-term contract), the High Court 
or Labour Court may have jurisdiction. This happened in the case of Boxer Superstores 
                                               
19 Section 112. 
20 Section 27. 
21 Section 151. 
22 Section 167. 
23 Act 28 of 1956 above. 
24 Du Toit D et al The Labour Relations Act of 1995: A Comprehensive Guide 2
nd
 ed (1998) Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths at 306. See also Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Bill 115 at 147-151.  
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and Another v Mbenya25 where a dismissed employee relied on a common law contract 
and therefore instituted a claim for damages in the High Court (instead of claiming for 
unfair dismissal in the Labour Court). It also happened in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & 
Others26 where the appellant, a public official, sought relief under the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)27 in the High Court instead of approaching the Labour 
Court. There are also a number of other cases which reveal that forum shopping is 
mainly used by litigants to avoid these specialised institutions and procedures (of the 
LRA) in favour of traditional common law and public law dispute resolution mechanisms. 
It is the aim of this research, amongst other things, to determine the cause or causes of 
this deviation from the specialised dispute resolution mechanisms of the LRA.  
 
The basic dispute resolution route stipulated by the LRA is that the matter must first be 
referred for conciliation either at the CCMA28 or at an accredited Bargaining Council.29  
 
In terms of the LRA the following referral periods are set:  
 
(a) Unfair dismissal disputes have to be referred within 30 days of the date of 
dismissal or within 30 days of the employer having decided to dismiss the 
employee.30  
                                               
25 (2007)(5) SA 450 (SCA). See also Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt (2001) 22 ILJ 2407 (SCA) and Old 
Mutual Life Assurance Co.SA Ltd v Gumbi (2007) 28 ILJ 1499 (SCA). 
26 (2008) 8 BLLR 97 (CC). See also Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province & 
Another (2008) 29 ILJ 1426; Fredericks & others v MEC for Education & Training, Eastern Cape & Others 
(2002) 2 SA 693 (CC) and Makambi v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (5) SA 449. 
27Act 3 of 2000. 
28 The CCMA is an autonomous statutory agency that operates independently from the state. 
29
 A Bargaining Council is an institution which trade unions and employers‟ organisations are empowered 
to establish in terms of Section 27 of the LRA. These councils have as one of their functions the 
resolution of disputes. To perform the dispute resolution functions under the LRA the council must be 
accredited. When such accreditation is obtained, the council can resolve disputes in terms of Section 
51.The Council will start accordingly by conciliating the matter and issue the certificate of outcome. If 
conciliation is unsuccessful and the parties so wish, the council will conduct an arbitration. If one or more 
of the parties to a dispute falls outside the scope of the council, or if the dispute relates to a matter that 
only the CCMA can resolve, such a dispute must be referred to the CCMA. Section 127 of the LRA 
provides for the procedure to be followed when applying for accreditation. Sections 51 and 127 provide 
for matters that may not be resolved by Bargaining Councils, for example disputes about collective 
agreements, closed shop and agency shop agreements. 
30 Section 191 (1)(b)(i) of the LRA. 
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(b) Unfair labour practice disputes must be referred within 90 days of the act or 
omission that allegedly constituted the unfair labour practice.31 
(c) Unfair discrimination disputes have to be referred within 6 months after the act or 
omission that allegedly constitutes unfair discrimination.32 
 
Upon referral, the matter will be set down for conciliation. The commissioner must try to 
reach a settlement between the parties.33 If the dispute is not resolved, the 
commissioner must issue a certificate of non-resolution and the nature of the dispute 
will determine whether it must be taken to arbitration (by the CCMA) or adjudication (by 
the Labour Court).34 The LRA makes a clear distinction between disputes that should be 
referred to arbitration and those that should be adjudicated by the Labour Court. 
Generally, a dispute will be taken to arbitration after a failed conciliation. However, there 
are exceptions. For example, unfair discrimination disputes must be adjudicated by the 
Labour Court after failed attempts at conciliation by the CCMA. On the contrary, the 
interpretation or application of collective agreements is resolved by conciliation and, if 
unsuccessful, by arbitration (adjudication is not permissible). Arbitration will also take 
place when a party to the dispute requests that the matter be resolved through 
arbitration.35 Section 141(1) of the LRA further allows parties to agree to the CCMA 
arbitrating disputes which would otherwise be determined by the Labour Court. The 
essence of arbitration is that the third party, the arbitrator, considers the versions of both 
parties and makes a binding decision. An arbitration award is final and binding and may 
be made an order of court.36  
                                               
31 Section 191(1)(b)(ii)of the LRA.   
32 Section 10 (2) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
33 The settlement agreement may be made an arbitration award (Section 142A of the LRA). This 
agreement may also be made an order of the Labour Court. Section 158(1)(c) of the LRA. This must take 
place by agreement of the parties on application by one of them and it happens only in relation to a 
matter that may be referred to arbitration or to the Labour Court. 
34 In addition to the arbitration procedure, the 2002 Amendments to the LRA added two new procedures, 
namely: the con-arb process [Section 195(5A)] and pre-dismissal arbitration (Section188A). In terms of 
the con-arb procedure, the CCMA or bargaining council will commence arbitration immediately after 
conciliation has failed (and thereby dispensing with the referral requirement for arbitration). Pre-dismissal 
arbitration allows employers in dismissal disputes to request the CCMA to conduct an arbitration instead 
of them (employers) holding a disciplinary enquiry.  
35 Section 136(1) (b) of the LRA. 





Since arbitration does not allow a right to appeal, there are restricted remedies for 
parties who are not satisfied with the award. The LRA provides only for review under 
these three sections: Section 145,37 158(1)(g) and 158(1)(h). Section 145 provides that: 
“any party to a dispute who alleges a defect in any arbitration proceedings under the 
auspices of the Commission may apply to the Labour Court for an order setting aside 
the arbitration award”. This section further provides for the time periods within which 
awards may be taken for review by the Labour Court.38 Section 158(1)(g) gives to the 
Labour Court the power “despite Section 145” to “review the performance or purported 
performance of any function provided for in terms of  this Act on any grounds that are 
permissible in law.” Section 158(1)(h) provides for the review of decisions taken or acts 
performed by the state in its capacity as an employer. The difference between these 
sections was considered in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others.39    
 
As far as adjudication of labour matters is concerned, Section 151 establishes the 
Labour Court as a court of law and equity. The Labour Court has the same inherent 
powers in relation to matters under its jurisdiction, as the provincial division of the High 
Court.40 Section 157(1) of the Labour Relations Act states that subject to the 
Constitution and unless otherwise provided for by the LRA, the Labour Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act or in 
terms of any other law are to be determined by the Labour Court. 
 
This section does two things. Firstly, it defines the jurisdiction of the Labour Court i.e. 
“exclusive” and secondly it circumscribes this jurisdiction i.e. “Subject to the Constitution 
and Section 173, and except where this Act provides otherwise.” Section 157(2), on the 
                                               
37 Section 145 read with Section 158(1) (g) of the LRA. 
38 Within six weeks of the date that the award was served on the applicant, unless the alleged defect 
involves corruption. If the alleged defect involves corruption, it must be referred within six weeks of the 
date that the applicant discovers the corruption. 
39 (1998) 19 ILJ 1425 (LAC). Section 145 applies to the review of arbitration awards made by 
commissioners of the CCMA. Section 158(1)(h) applies to administrative action taken by the state as 
employer. Section 158(1)(g) is a residual power to review administrative action. The court further held that 
the word „despite‟ in Section 158(1)(g) should be read as „subject to‟, thus making it unnecessary for the 
appellants to bypass Section 145 and rely on Section 158(1)(g). 
40 See Section 151(2).  
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other hand, provides that the Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High 
Court in respect of any violation of a fundamental right by the state in its capacity as an 
employer and in respect of the constitutionality of any executive conduct or act by the 
state in its capacity as an employer.  
 
The exclusivity and concurrency of jurisdictions of the Labour Court (as a specialised 
court) and the High Court (as a civil court) have been a cause for confusion over a long 
period. The failure in practice to clearly distinguish between situations where the dispute 
may be resolved by the civil courts or labour courts is also the reason why the court in 
3M SA (Pty) Ltd v SACCAWU41 cast doubt on the significance of the term “equity” as it 
appears in Section 151 of the LRA. The court held, accordingly that the Labour Court 
(and the Labour Appeal Court) has no power to adjudicate matters on the basis of 
fairness except where expressly authorized to do so: 
These two Courts are superior Courts of law. The only fairness that they apply 
in dealing with matters which come before them is such fairness as they are 
specifically required to apply in specific sections of the Act in respect of 
specific types of disputes as well as such fairness as every Court of law is 
required to observe in terms of the rules of natural justice.42 
 
This confusion is further exacerbated by a huge number of labour matters in which 
parties approached the civil courts43 instead of the Labour Court for relief. The basis of 
these claims was mainly the common law44 fixed-term contracts45 and public law 
(PAJA).46 
 
                                               
41 (2001) 5 BLLR 483 (LAC). 
42 At par  17. 
43“Civil court” here refers to both the Magistrates‟ and High Courts. In civil matters the quantum of the 
claim is decisive in determining whether the Magistrates‟ or the High Court should decide the dispute. The 
limit of the Magistrates‟ court is R100 000 and it seems that it seldom occurs that the amount claimed is 
less than this statutory limit, which is probably the reason why reference is often made to the term “High 
Court” (as opposed to civil courts) when dealing with these disputes. 
44 See for example Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt; Boxer Superstores Mthatha v Mbenya  and Denel 
(Edms) Bpk v Vorster (2004) 4 SA 481 (SCA).  
45 Boxer Superstores Mthatha & another v Mbenya. 
46 See Chirwa,supra; Fredericks ,supra and Nakin ,supra.  
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The first case in which this deviation from the traditional labour dispute resolution 
method took place was Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt.47 In this matter an employee 
(the respondent on appeal) whose fixed-term contract was prematurely terminated 
approached the High Court to claim damages for breach of contract. The employer 
(appellant on appeal) submitted that the matter should have been referred to the Labour 
Court in terms of the LRA and that the High Court lacked jurisdiction. In its special plea 
(filed in the court a quo), the appellant relied on Section 157(1) which states that 
“subject to the Constitution and unless otherwise provided for by the LRA, the Labour 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters that elsewhere in terms of this 
Act or in terms of any other law are to be determined by the Labour Court”. It contended 
that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate dismissals occasioned by 
operational requirements in terms of the Labour Relations Act. The employee excepted 
to the special plea and submitted that it did not disclose a defence. The Court a quo 
held in favour of the employee.  This matter went on appeal and the  same defence was 
still relied upon with the appellant submitting that the employee (respondent) has no 
remedies other than those provided for in chapter 8 of the LRA.48 The Appeal Court 
therefore decided that the legislature could not, by chapter 8, be deemed to have 
intended to deprive the employees of common law remedies which may, by 
comparison, be more generous than those provided by the Labour Relations Act.49 
 
The Appeal Court further held that a dispute will fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Labour Court only if the “fairness” of the dismissal is the subject of the employee‟s 
complaint. If the subject in dispute is “lawfulness” of the dismissal, then the High Court 
might as well entertain the matter. The Court noted:  
 
Its [the Labour Court‟s] exclusive jurisdiction arises only in respect of „matters   
that elsewhere in   terms of this Act or in terms of any other law are to be 
                                               
47
 (2001) 22 ILJ 2407 (SCA). 
48
 Chapter 8 protects employees against unfair dismissal and caps damages on 12 months‟ remuneration 
in cases of unfair dismissal and 24 months‟ in cases of automatic unfair dismissal. 
49
 The common law remedies may be generous in a sense that the dismissed employee will simply have 
to allege (and prove) the employer‟s repudiation and claim damages, while under the LRA the employer 
has the benefit of some defence e.g. operational requirements as in this case. Moreover, the employee 
can be in a better financial position than he would have been had he gone the statutory route (LRA).   
12 
 
determined by the Labour Court.‟ Various provisions of the 1995 Act identify 
particular disputes or issues that may arise between employers and 
employees and provide for such disputes or issues to be referred to the 
Labour Court for resolution, usually after attempts at conciliation have failed. 
In my view those are the „matters‟ that are contemplated by Section 157(1) 
and to which the Labour Court‟s exclusive jurisdiction is confined.50    
 
As a result of this judgment, the High Court (and the Supreme Court of Appeal) was 
flooded with cases involving disputes between employer and employee.51 The most 
significant cases which came before the court were Boxer Superstores & Another v 
Mbenya52; Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & others53; Makambi v MEC for Education, Eastern 
Cape54 and Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security & others.55 
 
In Boxer Superstores, supra the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the High Court will 
exercise jurisdiction in a labour matter if the unlawfulness (as opposed to fairness) of 
the dismissal is at issue. 
 
The issue of forum shopping also landed in the Constitutional Court, where the court 
painted a different picture in Chirwa v Transnet and Others.56 The Court in this case had 
to decide whether the dismissal of a public sector employee could be framed as 
administrative action   and be decided by an ordinary civil court. It was held that the 
primary objective of Section 157(1) is to “give effect to the declared object of the LRA to 
establish specialist tribunals with exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters arising from 
it.”57 In particular the Court held further that Section 157(2) purports to confer 
constitutional jurisdiction on the Labour Court. From this decision one can conclude that 
                                               
50 At par 2. 
51
 See the decisions in Boxer Superstores and Nakin above. 
52 (2007) 5 SA 450 (SCA). 
53 (2008) 8 BLLR 97 (CC). 
54 (2008) 5 SA 449 (SCA). 
55 (2009) 12 BLLR 1145 (CC). 
56 (2008) 8 BLLR 97 (CC). 
57 At par 113. 
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the existence of an administrative action in a dispute cannot prevent the Labour Courts 
from exercising jurisdiction. 
 
Therefore according to this decision, parties to a labour dispute can invoke neither 
contract nor administrative law to avoid the resolution mechanisms contained in the 
LRA. The court held that by enacting Section 157(2), Parliament did not intend to 
extend the High Court‟s jurisdiction in labour matters but to afford the Labour Court the 
capacity to address constitutional issues that sometimes arise in labour matters. In the 
words of Skweyiya J, the LRA “was envisaged to be a one-stop shop for all labour 
related disputes”.58 
 
1.4 Conclusion and Research Question 
 
In this chapter, the labour dispute resolution system was outlined. A brief background of 
case law relating to jurisdictional conflict was outlined so as to give an overview of 
problems that form part of this study. Case law has shown that the problem of forum 
shopping cuts across various areas of labour law; for example, the conflict between 
common law and statute (LRA) that arose as a result of a premature termination of a 
fixed term contract in the Fedlife case. The problem which is sought to be addressed by 
this study is to determine why forum shopping is possible and how it can be prevented. 
A critical investigation will also be conducted on various forms of forum shopping, and 
the current position in law as interpreted by the courts. 
 






                                               
58 At par 47. See further Fedlife Assurance v Wolfaardt on how the court dealt with the employee who 
relied on common law contract instead of the LRA. 
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       CHAPTER TWO 
 





The remedies for unfair dismissal of an employee are dealt with in Section 193 of the 
LRA. Reinstatement and re-employment are primary remedies for unfair dismissal. 
These primary remedies may not be granted under certain circumstances, however. If 
the employee does not wish to be reinstated (or re-employed) the remedy cannot be 
imposed upon that employee. The employee may not be re-instated or re-employed if 
the circumstances are such that the continuation of the employment relationship would 
be intolerable, it is not reasonably practicable for the employer to reinstate or the 
dismissal is only procedurally unfair.59 If any of these exceptions exists, the Court or 
tribunal will order compensation instead of reinstatement. 
 
Section 194 of the LRA regulates the amount of compensation payable for unfair 
dismissal and provides for the following limits:  
 
a) If dismissal is unfair only because the employer did not follow a fair procedure, 
compensation must be equal to the remuneration that the employee would have 
been paid between the date of dismissal and the last day of the hearing of the 
arbitration or adjudication, as the case may be, calculated at the employee‟s rate 
of remuneration at the date of dismissal.60 
b) For automatically unfair dismissal, compensation must not be more than the 
equivalent of 24 months‟ remuneration calculated at the employee‟s rate of 
remuneration at the date of dismissal.61 
                                               
59 Section 193(2) of the Act. 
60 Section 194(1) of the Act. 
61 Section 194(3) of the Act. 
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c) If the dismissal is found to be unfair because the employer did not prove that the 
reason was a fair reason related to the employee‟s conduct, capacity or based on 
the employer‟s operational requirements, compensation must not be less than 
the amount specified in subsection (1), and not more than the equivalent of 12 
months‟ remuneration calculated at the employee‟s rate of remuneration at the 
date of dismissal.62 
 
In all these instances the LRA requires that compensation be “just and equitable in all 
the circumstances.”63 In 2002 Section 194 (1) of the LRA was amended and when that 
happened, the LRA Amendment Act64 accorded the same treatment to a substantively 
unfair dismissal and a procedurally unfair dismissal for purposes of compensation. 
However, the court decided in HM Liebowitz (Pty) Ltd t/a The Auto Industrial Centre 
Group of Companies v Fernandes65 that the two forms of unfairness will still be 
substantially different when compensation is determined. Zondo J had the following to 
say: 
 
In a case where the dismissal is unfair only because an employer did not follow a 
fair procedure, one is dealing with an employee who did not deserve to continue 
in the employ of the employer in any event because there was a fair reason to 
dismiss such an employee and the employer only got the procedure wrong 
whereas in a subsection (2) case one is dealing with an employee who should 
                                               
62 Section 194(4) of  the Act. 
63 The court has judicial discretion to determine what “just and equitable” compensation is. In National 
Industrial Workers Union & others v Chester Wholesale Meats KZN (Pty) Ltd (2004) 25 ILJ 1293 (LC), 
Gering AJ, in awarding three months‟ salary in compensation, considered the fact that the dismissal was 
only procedurally unfair, fault that existed on the part of both parties, the length of service of the 
employees involved, the long period of unemployment resulting from the unfair dismissal and the period 
of time from the date when it became clear that there was a gap in communication between the employer 
and the union. In The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Tshishonga (2009) 9 BLLR 
862 LAC the court took into account the embarrassment suffered by the respondent, the gross humiliation 
as a result of being moved to a non-existent position and the costs of securing the services of an attorney 
to defend the respondent in an enquiry where the respondent was eventually found not guilty. 
64 Act 12 of 2002.The former provision drew a distinction between substantively unfair dismissal and one 
that is unfair by virtue of the employer not having followed the correct procedure.  
65 (2002) 4 BLLR (LAC). 
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not have been dismissed in the first  place and who should have been allowed to 
continue in the employer‟s employ.66 
 
From the perspective of the drafters of the LRA, forum shopping has the effect of 
undermining the objectives of the LRA and perhaps the whole Act itself; hence the 
remarks by Zondo JP in Langeveldt v Vryburg TLC67: 
 
One of the deficiencies in the dispute-resolution of the old Act which the 
stakeholders in the labour relations field sought to bury when they negotiated the 
new dispute-resolution dispensation under the Act was that the system was 
costly, inefficient and ineffective. Through the new system with its specialist 
institutions and its courts which are run by experts in the field, the stakeholders 
and parliament sought to ensure a certain efficient, cost-effective and expeditious 
system of resolving labour disputes. The fact that the High Courts also have 
jurisdiction in employment and labour disputes completely undermines and 
defeats that very important and laudable objective and thereby undermines the 
whole Act.68 
 
It is however interesting to note that this act and its objectives were primarily aimed at 
protecting employees, while it is employees themselves who are the cause of and 
continuation of forum shopping. It is also worth mentioning that there is nothing that 
prevents employees to waive rights and protections offered by legislation. 
Consequently, it seems that the ratio in Langeveldt will hold true only as far as the 
drafters of the Act are concerned. But to a dismissed employee who is subjectively 
involved in litigation, the following benefits will outweigh the problems caused by forum 
shopping (and perhaps the objectives of the Act):   
 
 No referral period-When taking the matter for resolution by the CCMA, parties 
must do so within 30 days of the date of dismissal or within 30 days of the 
                                               
66 Ibid at par 15. 
67 (2001) 22 ILJ 1116 (LAC). 
68 At par 1138-1139A. 
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employer having decided to dismiss the employee.69 These periods do not apply 
when the employee approaches the civil courts for relief. The only limitation for 
the employee seems to be the three years prescription under civil law. 
 Compensation is not capped.70 
 Legal representation is possible.71 
 Appeal is permissible.72 
 
In this chapter the focus will shift to a discussion of the two main issues before the court 
leaving an opportunity for forum shopping. These relate to fixed-term contracts and 




                                               
69 See Section 191(1)(b) and also Section 10 (2) of the EEA. 
70 See Section 194 of the LRA and Chapter III for a detailed discussion of compensation in the LRA. 
Suffice to say, in civil courts using common law remedies, employees can claim more than they can under 
the LRA. 
71 Section 135(4) of the LRA lists parties who may represent employers and employees in Arbitration and 
Conciliation proceedings. Section 138(4) lists parties who may represent employers and employees at 
arbitration proceedings. Section 135(4) was amended by Section 8(b) of the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act 127 of 1998 and subsequently deleted by Section 23 of the LRA amendment Act 12 of 
2002. Section 140(1) of Act 66 of 1995 provides that despite Section 138(4),  parties  are not entitled to 
be represented by legal practitioners in the arbitration  proceedings unless the commissioner and all the 
other parties consent or the commissioner concludes that it is unreasonable to deal with the dispute 
without legal representation after considering certain factors such as the complexity of the dispute, public 
interest  and the comparative ability of the opposing parties or their representatives to deal with the 
arbitration of the dispute. Section 140 (1) has been repealed, but is now still embodied in the footnote to 
Rule 25 of the CCMA Rules. The constitutionality of the exclusion of legal representatives at the CCMA 
was considered in Netherburn Engineering cc t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Modau NO & others (2009) 30 
ILJ 269 (LAC). The employer in this case argued that the restriction on legal representation infringed the 
constitutional right to equality, that the restriction was irrational and that it was in conflict with the right to 
fair administrative action. The full bench of the LAC rejected these arguments, finding that the restriction 
did not infringe the right to equality because arbitrations concerning matters, in  respect of which legal 
representations was allowed as of right, were distinguishable, because these matters were generally 
more complex. The LAC held further that the denial of legal representation conflicts with the right to fair 
administrative action, because not even the PAJA, which regulates the constitutional right to fair 
administrative action, confers an absolute right to legal representation before administrative tribunals. The 
Constitutional Court in the matter of Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Modau NO & 
others refrained from commenting on the issue of legal representation before the CCMA because it would 
not be in the interest of justice to determine the issue. This means that the issue of legal representation is 
quite problematic in proceedings before the CCMA. So, in civil proceedings, parties have the privilege 
and comfort of engaging legal representatives without any hassle.  
72 No appeal is allowed against arbitration awards by the CCMA. Review by the Labour Court and 
rescission by the CCMA are the only remedy for a party not satisfied with the outcome. See 3.4 for a 
detailed discussion.  
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2.2 Fixed-term Contracts 
 
The contract of employment is the foundation of the relationship between an employee 
and his or her employer. This kind of contract links the employer with the employee- 
irrespective of the form assumed by that employment contract. The employment 
contract is therefore the starting point of the application of all labour law rules. In other 
words, if there is no employment relationship between the parties, the rules of labour 
law do not apply. However, the employment contract is not without difficulties. Besides 
the hardship of sometimes having to distinguish between employment contracts and 
ordinary contractual relationships, the interaction between the employment contract and 
statute also creates problems.73  
 
In the law relating to dismissal, this interaction between the common law of contract and 
statutory employment law has led to various courts (and sometimes the same court) 
making different pronouncements on the jurisdictional debate, thus inciting forum 
shopping and retarding the search for legal certainty. Case law points to  the fact that 
the courts had to decide in particular whether disputes involving the breach and 
premature termination of the employment contract were to be decided under common 
law (by the High Courts) or statute (by the LRA resolution chambers). 
 
Common law recognizes three forms of remedies in cases of breach of contract. These 
are     (i) execution of the contract, (ii) cancellation of the contract and (iii) damages. The 
remedies of execution of the contract and of cancellation of the contract are mutually 
exclusive and the innocent party has a choice between the two. Although the innocent 
party can claim the two remedies in the alternative, enforcement of the one excludes the 
other.74 
 
The LRA allows the employer to dismiss the employee on the grounds of misconduct, 
incapacity and operational requirements (of the employer). Dismissal under these 
                                               
73 Basson et al: Essential Labour Law 5
th
 ed (2009) Labour Law Publications at 21. 
74 Havenga et al: General Principles of Commercial Law 7
th
 ed (2010) JUTA at 125. 
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grounds must comply with the requirements of substantive and procedural fairness. 
Substantive fairness means that there must be a proper reason or ground for dismissal, 
whilst procedural fairness envisages a proper hearing before dismissal.75 What is 
common about all these remedies is that they are all adjudicated through the LRA 
institutions. 
 
To contextualise the conflict between common law and statutory employment law 
(LRA), the facts in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt76 are worth considering. In this 
case the respondent, Mr Wolfaardt was employed on a fixed-term contract of five years. 
After only two years, the employer (appellant) terminated the contract on the ground 
that the respondent‟s position had become redundant. The respondent averred that the 
appellant had repudiated the contract. He further claimed that he had elected to accept 
the repudiation and claimed damages for breach of contract in the High Court, 
whereupon the appellant claimed that the High Court lacked jurisdiction and that the 
matter should therefore have been referred to the Labour Court under the LRA. 
 
In its investigation, the Court had to answer two questions: (i) whether the remedies 
under the LRA abolished the employee‟s common law claim for breach of contract and 
(ii) whether the premature termination of the employment contract in this matter falls 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The second question is extensively 
dealt with in chapter three below. Against the contention of the appellant, the majority of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, through Nugent AJA (as he then was), held that neither 
expressly nor by necessary implication does the LRA abrogate an employee‟s common 
law claim to enforce contractual rights.77 The Court also pointed to clear indications in 
the LRA that the legislature had no intention of abolishing the common law remedies 
                                               
75 In addition to the remedy of unfair dismissal, the LRA also provides for the remedy of automatically 
unfair dismissal  and unfair labour practice. 
76 (2001) 22 ILJ 2407 (SCA). 
77 The Court relied on Stadsraad van Pretoria v Van Wyk (1973) 2 SA 779 (A) in holding that the 
presumption against the deprivation of existing rights is applicable in this matter. Accordingly, it is 
presumed that the legislature did not intend to interfere with existing law and a fortiori, not to deprive 
parties of existing remedies for wrongs done to them. This will be the case only if the legislature states 
expressly or by necessary implication. See also SA Breweries Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union & 
Others (1990) 1 SA 92 (A) where the court applied the presumption and further held that in the case of 
ambiguity an interpretation which serves the existing rights of employees will be favoured. 
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and “the clearest indication that it had no such intention is Section 186 (b) which 
extends the meaning of „dismissal‟ to include non-renewal of the contract against the 
reasonable expectations of the employee.”78 
 
The Court held further that although the legislature dealt in particular with fixed-term 
contracts, it did not include the premature termination of such contracts notwithstanding 
that such termination would be unfair: 
 
The reason for that is plain: the common law right to enforce such a term 
remained intact and it was thus not necessary to declare a premature termination 
to be an unfair dismissal. The very reference to fixed term contracts makes it 
clear that the legislature recognised their continued enforceability and any other 
construction would render the definition absurd.79 
 
The majority decided that this matter concerns not the unfairness, but the unlawfulness 
of the dismissal and therefore the High Court was correctly approached for relief. 
However, Froneman AJA, for the minority, relying on the decision in National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd80 held that it was not conceivable how an 
unlawful dismissal could not be unfair at the same time. In the Vetsak case, Nienaber 
JA held: “There is no sure correspondence between unlawfulness and fairness. While 
an unlawful dismissal would probably always be regarded as unfair (it is difficult to 
                                               
78 At par 18 D -F. Section 186(1)(b) reads: “Dismissal means that an employee reasonably expected the 
employer to renew a fixed term contract of employment on the same or similar terms but the employer 
offered to renew it on less favourable terms, or did not renew it”. 
79 Ibid. Judge Nugent refers to two forms of absurdities: Firstly, if the employee in this case is compelled 
to exhaust the statutory remedies, the result would be that although the employee will have received 
more than is due at common law, but still the latter will not recover as of right even that which is payable 
at common law and instead must rest content with “compensation” which may be ludicrously small in 
comparison with the true loss. Secondly, if it were so that a plaintiff such as this is confined to a claim for 
claim for “compensation” in terms of Section 194, where the employer proves that “the reason for 
dismissal is a fair reason related to the employee‟s conduct or capacity or based on the employer‟s 
operational requirements” and “that the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure”, the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to any compensation. The Court concluded that such a result could not have 
been intended by the legislature. 
80 (1996) 6 BLLR 697 (AD). 
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conceive of circumstances in which it would not), a lawful dismissal would not for that 
reason alone be fair.”81 
 
The decision of the Court in Fedlife set a precedent for a series of cases that followed. 
Firstly, it was United National Public Servants Association of SA v Digomo & Others.82 
The SCA, relying on Fedlife, held that the remedies that the LRA provides against 
conduct that constitutes an „unfair labour practice‟ are not exhaustive of the remedies 
that might be available to employees in the course of the employment relationship. 
Particular conduct might therefore not only constitute an unfair labour practice (which 
can be resolved by invoking the LRA), but might also give rise to other causes of action 
(a contractual claim for example). 
 
Secondly, in Denel supra,83 the right to fair labour practices and the reciprocal duty 
(between employer and employee) to act fairly did not survive the Fedlife-jurisprudence 
either. Nugent JA held that if a disciplinary code has been included in the contract of 
employment, then a deviation from such a code constitutes a breach of contract and is 
therefore actionable in the civil courts. Accordingly, the Constitution, by introducing into 
the employment contract a reciprocal duty to act fairly, does not deprive contractual 
terms of their effect. Such implied duties would operate to improve the effect of unfair 
terms in the contract, or even to supplement the contractual terms where necessary, but 
not to deprive a fair contract of its legal effect.84 
 
In Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi85 the SCA took matters even further. 
According to the Court, the common law contract of employment has been developed in 
                                               
81 At par 592 G-H. 
82 (2005) 26 ILJ 1957 (SCA). 
83 The issue in this matter was the constitution of a disciplinary committee in terms of the code which 
formed part of the employment contract. The employee was dismissed by the committee which was not 
constituted in accordance with the stipulations of the disciplinary code. The employee successfully 
contested the departure from the code (and his subsequent dismissal) as a breach of contract.    
84 At par 16 E-I. 
85 (2007) 8 BLLR 699 (SCA).This decision (and the one in Boxer Superstores) was followed by the 
Eastern Cape High court  in MEC, Department of Roads & Transport, Eastern Cape & Another v Giyose 
(2008) 29 ILJ 272 (E), where the court held that the common law contract of employment has also 
developed to include the right to a  pre-transfer hearing for a public service employee and the High Court 
has jurisdiction to  entertain  the dispute in relation to the transfer on that basis. 
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accordance with the Constitution to include the right to a pre-dismissal hearing. As a 
result, the employee now has a common law contractual claim and not merely a 
statutory unfair labour practice right to a pre-dismissal hearing.86 Before this judgment 
and the present Constitution, an employee had to plead the incorporation of a 
disciplinary procedure into his contract of employment before he could rely on 
procedural unfairness constituting a breach of contract.87 The parties may opt for 
certainty and incorporate the right to pre-dismissal hearing in their contract.88 
 
Lastly came Boxer Superstores Mthatha & Another v Mbenya89 where the employee 
contended that her dismissal was substantially unfair (because she was not guilty of 
misconduct) and procedurally unfair (because at the disciplinary hearing, where she 
appeared with a shop steward representing her, she was not asked to plead guilty or 
not guilty) and therefore constituted a breach of contract. Cameron JA, comparing this 
case to those that preceded it, held that the Boxer case “pushes the boundary a little 
further”. 90 According to the court, this case raised the question whether an employee 
may sue in the High Court for relief on the basis that the disciplinary proceedings and 
the dismissal were “unlawful”, without alleging any loss apart from the salary. Drawing 
from the Gumbi91 decision, the court answered in the affirmative. The court concluded 
that the fact that contractual claims may also be decided by the Labour Court, through 
that court‟s unfair labour practice jurisdiction, does not detract it from the High Court‟s 
jurisdiction. 
 
The Court, although noting that the employee was careful to formulate her claim on the 
basis that her dismissal was “unlawful”, still accepted that, at the level of substance, the 
employee‟s complaint was one about the fairness of her dismissal. The Court further 
said that this characterization left out of account the fact that jurisdictional limitations 
                                               
86 At par 4. See also Modise & Others v Steve’s Spar, Blackheath 2001 (2) SA 406 (LAC). 
87 See Lamprecht & another v McNeillie 1994 (3) SA 665 (A). 
88 Ibid. 
89 This decision came two weeks after the Old Mutual judgment was handed down. 
90 At par 6. 
91 In Old Mutual the court held that the common law contract of employment has been developed in 
accordance with the constitution to include the right to a pre-dismissal hearing. This means therefore that 
every employee has a common law contractual claim, not merely a statutory unfair labour practice right to 
a pre-dismissal hearing. 
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often involve questions of form, and that the employee in this case formulated her claim 
to exclude any recourse to fairness, relying solely on contractual unlawfulness. 
 
Different from Fedlife, where the employee challenged the premature termination of his 
fixed-term contract as constituting an unlawful breach of contract and studiously 
avoiding making any reference whatsoever to fairness, the employee in Boxer 
Superstores specifically pleaded that her dismissal was unlawful (precisely because it 
was procedurally and substantially unfair). Taking from Old Mutual, which is authority for 
the proposition that it is permissible for an employee to bring a claim for procedural 
unfairness in the High Court based on a breach of contract, Boxer Superstores would 
now appear to be authority for the proposition that an employee can challenge the 
substantive fairness of his dismissal in the High Court, provided only that he pleads that 
his dismissal was unlawful because there was no good cause there for.92 
 
Froneman AJA therefore concluded that the issue in Fedlife was rather about the 
unfairness of the dismissal (as opposed to unlawfulness) and must be dealt with in 
accordance with the procedure set out in Section 191 of the LRA, “a procedure which in 
one way or another ends up with the Labour Court having the final say”. The judge 
further classified this matter to be a constructive dismissal (rather than a repudiation of 
a common law contract) as defined by Section 186 (1) (e) of the LRA.93 Since the LRA 
allows the Labour Court to award damages (in Section 195), the respondent‟s demands 
could have been easily met in that regard. 
 
I submit that there could not be a better way of understanding the real claim of the 
employee in Fedlife than that proposed by Froneman AJA (i.e. the employee terminated 
the employment contract instead of accepting a repudiation as claimed because the 
employer rendered continued employment intolerable (by rendering the employee‟s 
                                               
92 Pretorius P & Myburgh A: “A dual system of dismissal law: Comment on Boxer Superstores Mthatha & 
Another v Mbenya (2007) 28 ILJ 2209 (SCA)” (2007) 28 ILJ 2172. See also Key Delta v Marriner (1998) 6 
BLLR 647 (E). 
93 Section 186(1)(e) reads: “Dismissal means that an employee terminated a contract of employment with 
or without notice  because the employer  made continued employment intolerable for the employee.”   
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position redundant). However this view does not apparently survive scrutiny. Garbers94 
states three reasons for not conforming to this view: Firstly, he states that the principal 
reason for the introduction of unfair dismissal rules, as currently evidenced by section 
186 (a) of the LRA, has been the recognition of the reality that lawful dismissals are not 
necessarily fair, rather than the assumption that unlawful dismissals are always unfair. 
Secondly, one of the cornerstones of fairness, he argues, is that it cuts both ways-in 
favour of both employer and employee.95 Thirdly, he states that experience with fairness 
in the context of constructive dismissal shows that unlawful conduct by an employer (i.e. 
breach of an employment contract) is not necessarily unfair. The point then is that 
although most unlawful conduct by an employer will also be unfair, this is not 
necessarily the case, irrespective of whether one takes a static position, or a 
constitutionally-infused view of the common law.   
 
In Fedlife the majority judgment was informed by the role of labour law in protecting 
employees against the employer‟s common law right to terminate the contract at will.96 It 
is on this account that cases like Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board97 were 
decided. In this case, an employee was retrenched a year into his five years contract. 
He had been invited to apply for an alternative post in the employer‟s restructured 
operation, but another employee was appointed. The Court held that the employer is 
free not to enter into a fixed-term contract but to conclude a contract for an indefinite 
period if he thinks that there is a risk that he might have to dispense with the employee‟s 
services before the expiry of the term. If the employer chooses to enter into a fixed-term 
contract, he takes the risk that he might have to dismiss the employee during the 
subsistence of the contract but is prepared to take that risk. If he has elected to take 
                                               
94 Garbers C: “The Battle of the Courts: Forum Shopping in the aftermath of Wolfaardt and Fredericks” 
2002(1) Law Democracy and Development 97. 
95 See Numsa v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd & Others at 461 B and Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead (2000) 
21 ILJ 571 (LAC) at  par 599 H-I (per Willis JA). 
96 At par 13.                                          
97 (2005) 2 BLLR 115 (LAC). 
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such a risk, then the employer cannot be heard to complain when the risk 
materialises.98 
 
The Court in Buthelezi, relying on Fedlife, further held that in the absence of a clear 
indication from the LRA that the legislature intended to alter the rule relating to 
premature termination of fixed-term contracts during their currency, it cannot be argued 
that the Act had such an effect.99 It was concluded therefore that the employer cannot 
dismiss the fixed-term contract employee for operational reasons.  
 
The principles laid down in these judgments are open to criticism. Firstly, the notion that 
the legislature did not intend to interfere with existing law when creating new statutory 
rights cannot be sustained any longer. While this may have been true in the pre-
constitutional dispensation, it can hardly be said of statutes which are enacted for the 
express purpose of giving effect to fundamental rights. Pre-existing common law 
remedies, by implication, are deemed not to be enough to meet this objective; and this 
being the case, there are no clear grounds for assuming that those remedies will 
continue to co-exist with the statutory remedies. Rather the opposite view should be 
upheld.100 
 
Though dealing with a different field of law, the Constitutional Court in Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Others101 rejected the notion set down in 
Fedlife that statute did not expressly alter common law by creating new remedies. The 
Court, interpreting the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), referred to the 
Pharmaceutical case102 and held as follows: 
 
                                               
98 At par 11 A-B. According to the Court, this principle applies to both parties. The employee also, by 
entering into a fixed-term contract, takes a risk that the term of the contract he could be offered a more 
lucrative job while he has an obligation to complete the contract term. 
99 At par 14. See also Casely NO v Minister of Defence 1973 (1) SA 630 (A). 
100 Du Toit D “A Common law Hydra Emerges from the Forum-shopping Swamp” (2010) 31 ILJ 21.  
101 (2004) 4 SA 490 (CC). 
102 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa and  Others (2000) 2 SA 674 (CC). 
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There are not two systems of law regulating administrative action-the common 
law and the Constitution- but only one system of law grounded in the 
Constitution. The Courts‟ power to review administrative action no longer flows 
directly from the common law but from PAJA and the Constitution itself. The 
grundnorm of administrative law is now to be found in the first place not in the 
doctrine of ultra vires, nor in the doctrine neither of parliamentary sovereignty, 
nor in the common law itself, but in the principles of our Constitution. The 
common law informs the provisions PAJA and the Constitution, and derives its 
force from the latter. The extent to which the common law remains relevant to 
administrative review will have to be developed on a case-by-case basis as the 
courts interpret and apply the provisions of PAJA and the Constitution.103 
 
PAJA, like the LRA, was enacted to give effect to a constitutional right. Like the LRA, it 
contains no provision abolishing the common law remedies. To make matters worse, 
PAJA does not even have a provision that gives it supremacy over other laws in the 
event of conflict, but still the Court in Bato Star did not find it difficult to decide that it had 
trumped over common law by necessary implication.104 With the existence of Section 
210 of the LRA,105 therefore the Court in Fedlife had more than enough reasons to 
decide in favour of statutory remedies instead of common law 
 
2.3. Public Sector Employment Law 
 
2.3.1 The legal position before Chirwa 
 
The application of administrative law in labour matters is a highly contentious area of 
our contemporary labour law.106 During the pre-Constitution era, the 1956 Industrial 
Conciliation Act was operational. The Industrial Conciliation Act was a reaction to the 
                                               
103 At par 22 H-I. 
104 Ibid at 14. 
105  Section 210 of the LRA reads: “If any conflict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, arises 
between this Act and the provisions of any other law save the Constitution or any Act expressly amending 
this Act, the provisions of this Act will prevail.” 
106 Ngcukaitobi: “Life After Chirwa: Is There Scope for Harmony between Public Sector Labour Law and 
Administrative Law?” (2008) ILJ 29 849 at 862. 
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common law contract, which did not provide for the employees‟ right to be heard before 
dismissal. Two major changes were introduced by this Act. Firstly, employees could 
only be dismissed for fair reasons and after a fair procedure had been followed. 
Secondly, the Industrial Court was given the power to order an employer to re-instate an 
employee where the dismissal was found to be unfair. Nonetheless, public service 
employees were expressly excluded from the operation of this Act.107 
 
In 1991 the SCA handed down what could be considered the origin of public servants‟ 
protection by common law and later statute. In Administrator, Transvaal & Others v 
Zenzile & Others,108 the court held that the audi alterem rule was applicable to the 
dismissal of public servants. In quashing the summary dismissal of hospital employees 
without hearing, Hoexter JA stated 
 
One is here concerned not with mere employment under a contract service 
between two private individuals, but with a form of employment which invests the 
employee with a particular status which the law will protect. Here the employer 
and the decision-maker is a public authority whose decision to dismiss involved 
the exercise of public power. The element of public service injected by statute 
necessarily entails, so I consider, that the respondents were entitled to the 
benefit of the application of the principles of natural justice before they could be 
summarily dismissed for misconduct.109 
 
                                               
107 Act 28 of 1956 as amended. Section 2 of the Act read: “ This Act (except section sixty-three) shall not 
apply to persons in respect of their employment in farming operations or in domestic households nor to 
officers of parliament in respect of their employment as such nor, subject to the provisions of Subsections 
(3) and (9), to persons employed by the state in respect of their employment as such nor to any employee 
of any local authority designated by such authority in terms of any law as chief administrative officer of the 
local authority, in respect of his employment as such nor to the performance of work  in a charitable 
institution for which the persons performing it receive no remuneration nor to work performed in or in 
connection with any university, college, school or other educational institution maintained wholly or partly 
from public funds as part of the education or training of the persons performing it nor to university 
students in respect of their employment in any undertaking, industry, trade or occupation as part of their 
university training if such employment is required for the completion of their curricula.”  
108 1991(1) SA 21 (A).  
109 At par 270 F-H.  
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The Court further emphasised the jural nature of the powers exercised by public bodies 
when dismissing employees: 
 
The exercise of a statutory power to dismiss is not deprived of its jural character 
simply because a corresponding right to dismiss exists at common law or that 
provision for it may be made in a contract. The common law or contractual right 
gains an added dimension and is invested with special significance by its express 
enactment in a statute. This consequence cannot be ignored; and it lays the 
foundation of the classic formulation of the audi rule.110   
 
This decision was embraced and followed by the court in Sibiya and Another v 
Administrator Natal and Another.111 In this matter, the applicants‟ employment was 
terminable on a month‟s notice, which notice was issued on the applicants before their 
dismissal. The issue therefore was whether the administration could lawfully dismiss the 
applicants without having observed the audi alteram partem rule by giving them a 
hearing and the opportunity to make representations with regard to their dismissals. The 
Court, referring to the decision in Zenzile, held that there was no distinction between 
these two cases, except the fact that the employees in Zenzile were summarily 
dismissed. The  Court therefore concluded that the contemplated invasion of an existing 
right (to continued employment) was, by and large, sufficient in the field of employment 
to bring the rule into operation, and that right was surely threatened once a dismissal by 
notice was on the cards, no less than when a summary dismissal happened to be. The 
dismissals in this matter were also nullified. 
 
These decisions meant that the exclusion of public service employees from the 
application of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 did mean that these employees 
were not completely unprotected against arbitrary dismissals. 
 
                                               
110 At par 273 B-C.  
111 1991(2) SA 591. 
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Mention must also be made of the judgement that influenced the decision of the court in 
Zenzile. In Administrator, Transvaal & Others v Traub & Others,112 the court held that 
when a statute empowers a public body to give a decision prejudicially affecting an 
individual in his liberty or property or existing rights, the individual has to be heard 
before the decision is taken unless the statute expressly or by implication indicates the 
contrary. These pronouncements, as made by the courts, meant that public servants 
were not completely without protection and the harsh effects of their exclusion from the 
application of the Public Service Act113 were lessened. 
 
When the Interim Constitution was adopted in1994, it introduced two fundamental rights 
in this regard: the right to fair labour practices (Section 27) and the right to just 
administrative action (Section 24).These rights were later imported into the final 
constitution.114 The right to fair labour practices is dealt with in Section 23 whilst Section 
33 addresses the right to just administrative action. Section 33(3) calls for the 
enactment of national legislation to give effect to the rights in Section 33, hence the 
passing of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).115 Likewise, Section 23 
contemplated the enactment of legislation to give effect to the rights provided for in it, 
hence the promulgation of the Labour Relations Act. Other national laws, such as the 
Public Service Act, the Police Services Act 68 of 1995 and the Employment of 
Educators Act,116 were also adjusted to be in line with the Constitution. PAJA defines 
“administrative action” as: 
 
„any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by- 
a) An organ of state , when- 
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; 
or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation ; or 
                                               
112 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). 
113 Act 103 of 1994. 
114 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. 
115 Act 3 of 2000. 
116 Act 76 of 1998. 
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b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering 
provision, which  adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a 
direct, external legal effect...‟ 
 
Section 1 of this Act defines “decision” as: “any decision of an administrative nature 
made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under an empowering provision”. 
Certain types of decisions are expressly excluded by Section 1 from the definition of 
administrative action and therefore from the application of PAJA.117 
 
In giving effect to these crucial constitutional rights, both the LRA and PAJA were 
eventually drawn into the jurisdictional debate. The debate is substantially centred on 
the rights of public-sector workers. A study of case law and academic opinion shows 
some inconsistencies in the laws that should regulate public service employment in 
general and their dismissal in particular. For instance, two divergent viewpoints exist in 
relation to this issue. Firstly, there is a view that holds that employment relationships 
should be regulated by labour law (Section 23 of the Constitution and all labour 
legislation), to the exclusion of administrative law (Section 33 of the Constitution and 
PAJA). The second view argues that the exercise of public power inevitably attracts 
administrative law as well as labour law, so that remedies are available in both 
                                               
117  Section 1(i) (b) mentions the following decisions: 
“(aa) the executive powers or functions of the National Executive, including the powers or functions 
referred to in Sections 79(1) and (4), 84(2)(a),(b),(c),(d),(f),(g),(h),(i) and (k),85(2) (b),(c),(d) and 
(e),91(2),(3),(4) and (5), 93,97,98,99 and 100 of the Constitution; 
(bb) the executive powers or functions of the Provincial Executive, including the powers or functions 
referred to in Sections 121(1) and (2), 125(2)(d),(e) and (f), 126, 127(2),132(2),133(3)(b),137 138,139 and 
145 of the Constitution; 
(cc) the executive powers or functions of a municipal council; 
(dd) the legislative functions of Parliament, a provincial legislature or a municipal council; 
(ee) the judicial functions of a judicial officer of a court referred to in Section 166 of the Constitution or of a 
Special Tribunal established under Section 2 of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 
74 of 1996, and the judicial functions of a traditional leader under customary law or any other law; 
(ff) a decision to institute or continue a prosecution; 
(gg) a decision relating to any aspect regarding the nomination, selection or appointment of a judicial 
officer or any other person, by the Judicial Service Commission in terms of any law; 
(hh) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of any provision of the Promotion of Access 
to Information Act 2 of 2000; or 
(ii) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of Section 4(1).” 
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branches of law in cases of public-sector employment.118 These two divergent views are 
explored below. This exploration is mainly in the form of case law. 
 
2.3.2 Pre-Chirwa decisions favouring the LRA 
 
In 2004, the Labour Court in Public Servants Association obo Haschke v MEC for 
Agriculture & Others119 had to decide whether the refusal by a state employer to 
promote the applicant constituted an unfair labour practice. Nonetheless the court 
deemed it necessary to make a comment on the relevance of PAJA to labour disputes. 
The court held accordingly that although labour law and administrative law share many 
common characteristics, they still remain distinct.120 
 
The Court held that although there is no explicit statutory injunction in the labour laws to 
give effect to the right to just administrative action, there is an obligation to comply with 
it as one of the rights in the Bill of Rights. However, the Court held, if the right to just 
administrative action competes or is in conflict with the right to fair labour practices then 
the LRA and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, read with the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices, must prevail over the right to administrative 
justice.121 According to the court, this view is further reinforced by Sections 210 and 63 
of the LRA and the EEA respectively. These sections state that if any conflict arises 
between these Acts and the provisions of any other law, save the Constitution or any 
Act expressly amending these Acts, the provisions of these Acts will prevail.122 
 
In SA Police Union (SAPU) and Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police 
Service and Another,123  the Labour Court was faced with a challenge by the applicant 
unions (SAPU and POPCRU) of the decision by the National Commissioner of the 
SAPS to introduce an eight-hour shift system for its members throughout the country. 
                                               
118 Hoexter C: Administrative Law in South Africa 1
st 
ed (2007) JUTA at 194. 
119 (2004) 25 ILJ 1750 (LC). 
120 See also Traub, Zenzile and Sibiya. 
121 At par 156 A. 
122 Ibid at B 
123 (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 (LC). 
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The unions‟ main challenge was based on the right to just administrative action and the 
contention that the commissioner‟s decision to change the shift system constituted 
administrative action which was reviewable under Section 6 of PAJA.  
 
In deciding whether the decision to change shifts was an administrative action, the 
Court paid particular attention to the power exercised by the commissioner. Firstly the 
court held that the power exercised by the Commissioner in this instance was not public 
power. Neither was the function performed a public function. The source of the power in 
regard to labour relations was Section 24(1) of the Police Services Act 68 of 1995, 
which empowered the Minister to make regulations relating to the conditions of service 
of members and labour relations. Therefore, acting in terms of these powers, the 
Minister bestowed the prerogative on the Commissioner to determine working hours, 
which prerogative he could exercise unilaterally, or bilaterally, in terms of the existing 
contracts of employment or collective agreements, depending on the circumstances.124  
 
Secondly, the Court held that although the commissioner‟s power was derived from a 
public source, the source of power, while relevant, was not necessarily decisive. 
Equally, if not more important, were the nature of the power, its subject-matter and 
whether it involved the exercise of a public duty. The Court found that there was nothing 
inherently public about setting the working hours of police and therefore the whole act 
did not constitute administrative action under PAJA. According to the Court, the matter 
fell more readily within the domain of the contractual regulation of private employment 
relations.125 My view is that this decision, exalts the LRA because, the mere existence 
of an employer-employee relationship presupposes conformity with labour legislation in 
general and, in particular, the LRA in cases of dismissal. 
 
In Hlophe & Others v Minister of Safety and Security & Others,126 Van Niekerk AJ 
referred to the SAPU decision above and held that the decision to transfer an employee 
does not constitute administrative action that invites review either under PAJA or 
                                               
124 At par 52. 
125 Ibid. 
126 (2006) 3 BLLR 297 (LC). 
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Section 33 of the Constitution. To the extent that the courts previously extended the 
reach of administrative law to ensure fairness in the exercise of employment discipline 
in the public sector, the extension of the LRA to that sector now ensures labour rights to 
public sector workers.127 
 
2.3.3 Pre-Chirwa decisions favouring PAJA 
 
The High Court in Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) & Others v Minister of 
Correctional Services & Others128 viewed protections afforded by labour law and 
administrative law as complementary and cumulative; and not destructive of each other. 
The Court in this matter had to decide whether the dismissal of a correctional officer by 
the Department of Correctional Services was an administrative action (and therefore 
reviewable under Section 6 of PAJA). It was argued on behalf of the applicants that their 
dismissal was contrary to internal policies and therefore unlawful. The respondent 
contended, however, that the decision to dismiss the applicants was not administrative 
action since it did not involve the exercise of power, and this was so because the 
decision did not affect the public as a whole (and was consequently not reviewable 
under PAJA).  
 
Plasket J held that in his view, the “elusive” concept of public power is not limited to 
exercises of power that impact on the public at large. Again, many administrative acts 
do not. For instance, the exercise of the power to arrest is a good example of an 
administration action that would only have an impact on the arrestee. In this instance 
what makes the power involved a public power is the fact that it has been vested in a 
public functionary who is required to exercise it in the public interest, and not in his or 
her own private interest or at his or her own disposition.129 The judge further held that:  
                                               
127 At par 13. The Court made reference to Murphy AJ‟s sentiments in SAPU at par 55. 
128 (2006) 27 ILJ 555 (E). 
129 At par 53. Plasket J also refers to the dissenting judgment of Schreiner JA in Mustapha & Another v 
Receiver of Revenue, Lichtenburg & others 1958 (3) SA 343 (A) at 347 D-G, in which he held that where 
a minister exercised a statutory power having a contractual aspect he acted as a state official and not as 
a private owner, who needs to listen to no representation and is entitled to act as arbitrarily as he pleases, 
so long as he breaks no contract. Instead, the minister, because he received his powers from the statute, 
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There is nothing incongruous about individuals having more legal protection 
rather than less, or of more than one fundamental right applying to one act, or of 
more than one branch of law applying to the same set of facts. This also does not 
necessarily mean that there is a conflict between the PAJA and the Labour 
Relations Act which would mean that the latter trumps the former in terms of 
Section 210 of the Labour Relations Act.130 
 
The Court held that it was bound by the decision of the court in Zenzile, and on its basis 
concluded that the power to dismiss correctional officers in this case was a public power 
and that, all other elements of the definition of administrative action being present, the 
decisions under challenge are subject to review in terms of Section 6 of the PAJA. 
 
In Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services, Department of Correctional 
Services & Others,131 the Labour Court declined to follow those judgments in which it 
had been held that employment-related decisions do not constitute administrative 
action.132 The Court, answering whether transfers in the public sector constituted 
administrative acts, accordingly held that before the enactment of the PAJA, such 
transfers were always treated as administrative acts. The Legislature must have 
therefore been aware of this line of decisions when the PAJA was drafted. According to 






2.3.4 Chirwa v Transnet and the legal position  
                                                                                                                                                       
could only act within its limitations, express or implied. According to Plasket J, this passage encapsulates 
the essential difference between public and private power. 
130 At par 60. Plasket J also acknowledged the fact that public employees enjoyed greater protection than 
private employees and that this is an anomaly. However, he still felt that it was for parliament, and not the 
courts, to deal with the anomaly if it so wished.  
131 (2006) 27 ILJ 2127 (LC). 
132 See SAPU and Hlophe supra. 




The judgment in Chirwa comprised two majorities and a minority judgment. In the first 
majority judgment Skweyiya J134 noted, with reference to Section 210 of the LRA that 
the LRA is the pre-eminent legislation in labour matters that are dealt with by that Act.135 
Only the Constitution itself or legislation that expressly amends the LRA can take 
precedence over such labour matters. PAJA came into effect five years after the LRA 
had been promulgated and Section 210 of the LRA remained unchanged regardless. 
The legislature significantly left Section 210 unchanged because it intended that PAJA 
should not interfere with the pre-eminence of the LRA and its specialised labour 
disputes mechanisms. 
 
As far as the position of state employees is concerned, the Court held that it does not 
matter who the employer is. The LRA is the primary source in matters concerning 
allegations by employees of unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice and it therefore 
binds private and public (the state and its organs) employers alike. 
 
The Court further noted: 
 
Ms Chirwa is not afforded an election [between the LRA and PAJA]. She cannot 
be in a preferential position simply because of her status as a public sector 
employee. There is no reason why this should be so, as Section 23 of the 
Constitution, which the LRA seeks to regulate and give effect to, serves as the 
principal guarantee for all employees. All employees (including public service 
employees, save for the members of the defence force, the intelligence agency 
and the secret service, academy of intelligence and COMSEC), are covered by 
unfair dismissal provisions and dispute resolution mechanisms under the Act 
.The LRA does not differentiate between the state and its organs as an employer, 
and any other employer. Thus, it must be concluded that the state and other 
employers should be treated in similar fashion.136          
                                               
134 With Moseneke DCJ; Madala; Ngcobo; Nkabinde; Sachs; Van der Merwe JJ and Navsa AJ concurring. 
135 At par 50. 




Public sector employees are not at liberty to choose between the LRA and PAJA. They 
are bound by the LRA. In the second majority judgment, Ngcobo J held that LRA caters 
for all employees, whether employed in the public sector or private sector. Accordingly, 
the powers given to the Labour Court under Section 158(1)(h) to review the executive or 
administrative acts of the state as an employer is a manifestation of the intention to 
bring public sector employees under the ambit of “one comprehensive framework of 
law‟‟ regulating employees from all sectors.137 
 
As to whether the applicant had two causes of action (one under PAJA and the other 
under the LRA), Ngcobo J held that the conduct of the respondent in terminating the 
employment contract does not constitute administration. It has more to do with labour 
and employment relations. The mere fact that Transnet is an organ of state which 
exercises public power does not transform its termination of the applicant‟s employment 
contract into administrative action.138 Support for this proposition is found in the 
structure of the Constitution, which draws a distinction between administrative action 
and labour relations. Though they share some characteristics, these two areas of law 
are recognised by the Constitution as distinct.139 The judge further held that historically, 
recourse was had to administrative law in order to protect employees who did not enjoy 
the protection that private sector employees enjoyed. Therefore, with the codification of 
administrative and labour law, the principles laid down in Zenzile and other similar 
cases cease to apply.140 The LRA (and other labour legislation) covers all employment 
sectors. 
                                               
137 At par 102. 
138 At par 142. In President of the Republic of South Africa & Others v South African Rugby Football Union 
& others 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC), the Court held that not all conduct of State functionaries entrusted with 
public authority will constitute administrative action under Section 33 of the Constitution. The Court made 
an example of the distinction between the constitutional responsibility of cabinet ministers to ensure the 
implementation of legislation and their responsibility to develop policy and to initiate legislation. The Court 
stated that the former constitutes administration, while the latter does not. It further held that the test for 
determining whether conduct constitutes administrative action is not the question whether the action 
concerned is performed by a member of the Executive arm of Government. What matters here is the 
function that is performed. The question is whether the task that is performed is administrative action or 
not. 
139 At par 143. 
140 See SAPU  supra at par 66. 
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In a dissenting judgment, Langa J approached the matter from the grounds of policy. 
According to him, both PAJA and the LRA protect important constitutional rights and a 
presumption should not be made that one right should be more protected than the 
other. Accordingly, a litigant is entitled to the full protection of both rights, even when 
they seem to cover the same ground. In agreement with Cameron JA in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, he referred to the following passage:  
 
We must end where we began: with the Constitution. I can find no suggestion 
that, where more than one right may be in issue, its beneficiaries should be 
confined to a single legislatively created scheme of rights. I can find in it no 
intention to prefer one legislative embodiment of a protected right over neither 
another; nor any preferent entrenchment of rights or of the legislation springing 
from them.141 
 
This means that there is no reason in the Constitution to suggest that in a claim that 
constitutes both a dismissal and administrative action, the law under the LRA should be 
preferred. The legislature is capable of resolving problems of duplication by conferring 
sole jurisdiction to deal with any disputes relating to administrative action under PAJA 
arising out of employment upon the Labour Court. In the absence of it doing so, the 
employee will have a choice between actions under PAJA and those under the LRA. 
 
The question whether the dismissal in question constituted administrative action was 
answered in the negative. Firstly, the dismissal did not take place in terms of any 
statutory authority, but rather in terms of the contract itself.142 Secondly, when 
dismissing the applicant, Transnet Ltd was not exercising a public power or performing 
a public function as required by PAJA. This is mainly because Transnet, in exercising its 
contractual rights, has no authority over its employees in general, and gains no 
                                               
141 Transnet Ltd & Others v Chirwa (2007) 2 SA 198 (SCA) at Par 65. 
142 Ibid at par 185. However, in AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council (2006) 
BCLR 1255 (CC) the Constitutional Court held that decisions in public-sector employment can under 
certain circumstances be considered administrative action for the purposes of PAJA. The administrative 
nature of a particular relationship cannot be disregarded simply because the parties exercise contractual 
power. After consideration of a number of factors, a decision can be found to be administrative action. 
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advantage over the applicant in particular, by virtue of the fact that it is a public entity.143 
In contrasting this case to the judgment in POPCRU,144 the court could also not find the 
“pre-eminence of the public interest” in the services rendered by the human resources 
department of the Transnet Pension Fund. 
 
2.3.5 The legal position after Chirwa 
 
The majority decision in Chirwa has caused confusion amongst the lower courts. This 
has led to different reactions and interpretations by these courts, further leading to some 
inconsistency and uncertainty. In the Eastern Cape division, the High Court in Nakin v 
MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province & Another145 had to determine 
whether the failure by the department to implement an approved recommendation 
amounted to an administrative action and therefore subject to  review by a civil court. 
The Court held that the decision in Chirwa distinguished its earlier decision in 
Fredericks without overruling it.  
 
Froneman J held that the majority decision in Chirwa may have disturbed what he 
considered “a settled state of affairs” and it did not have the effect of overruling the 
existing state of the law.146 He further stated that lower courts are entitled to expect that 
when previously authoritative judgments are overruled, the nature and scope of that 
overruling should be stated in clear and express terms.147 In rejecting Chirwa’s 
preference of purpose–built framework over non-purpose-built framework,148 Froneman 
J held that the development of a coherent jurisprudence in labour law cannot take place 
in one exclusive forum.149 This development is rather informed by the extent to which it 
                                               
143 Ibid at par 187. 
144 Note 188 at par 54. The Court, in deciding that the dismissal of correctional officers amounted to an 
administrative action, took into consideration the pre-eminence of the public interest in the proper 
administration of prisons; and the attainment of the purposes specified in the Correctional Services Act 
111 of 1998.  
145 (2008) 29 ILJ 1426 (E). 
146 At par 13. Accordingly the issue of the High Court‟s jurisdiction to hear employment matters was 
settled in Fredericks and did not have to be resurrected. 
147 At par 28. See also Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter 1938 AD 195. 
148 See Chirwa at par 41 to 43. 
149 At par 30. 
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gives proper expression to the right of everyone to fair labour practices in terms of the 
Constitution.150 Suggesting an all-inclusive approach, he further noted: 
 
The nature of the legal employment relationship between the applicant, a public 
employee, and the department, an organ of state, is a complex one that is not in 
my view capable of exclusionary compartmentalization into only one of the three 
possibilities mentioned above (contract, administrative law and unfair labour 
practice). The common law contract of public employment is „framed‟ by 
administrative law principles and should include, as a constitutionally mandated 
implied legal term, the right to fair labour practices. Fairness is required in 
administrative justice, in labour legislation, and, yes, in contract too. And fairness 
has much to do with equality, dignity and freedom; founding values of our 
Constitution. To view these interlocking aspects of a public employment 
relationship in separate compartments of their own would deprive one of viewing 
the whole and complete picture of such a relationship. And in the process one 
might forget to ask and assess the real substantive issue at stake in a particular 
case.151 
  
With the authority of Fredericks, the court concluded that the failure by the Department 
to implement the applicant‟s reinstatement meets all the four corners of administrative 
justice as defined in PAJA and the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim. 
  
The issue of Chirwa not overruling Fredericks also troubled the court in Makambi v 
MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape.152 By deciding that the dismissal of a 
public servant does not amount to administrative action and also that the High Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear the matter, the court appeared to be on the Chirwa side of the 
conflict. Nonetheless, the court expressed its discontent (with Chirwa not overruling 
Fredericks) by holding that if two superior courts make different rulings, lower courts are 
                                               
150 Ibid. 
151 At par 50. 
152 (2008) 8 BLLR 711 (SCA). 
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therefore free to “pick and choose” between them.153 Also, Nugent JA observed that 
there was no legal basis for the decision of the majority in Chirwa. Accordingly, the 
majority interpreted the LRA as seeking to encompass both employees in the public and 
private sector and of being vindictive of their rights- something which the legislature 
denies in section 157(2).154 He also concluded that Fredericks was not overruled 
because it seemed to be good law and it would be so until it was overruled or replaced 
by statutory amendment.155  
 
The judgment in Makhanya v University of Zululand156 afforded yet another opportunity 
for Nugent JA to further come down on Chirwa. Accordingly, the two findings in Chirwa 
are “mutually destructive”.157 After deciding that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to hear 
the matter, the court in Chirwa could not have gone forth to hold that the appellant‟s 
claim was bad in law, because to do so the court must have had jurisdiction.158 He 
further held that the appellant in Chirwa (and also the appellant in this matter) had two 
separate claims; one under the LRA and another under administrative law. There is 
therefore nothing wrong with the appellant bringing both claims in one court (under the 
concurrent jurisdiction of the Labour and High Courts) or each in one of these courts.159 
Also important was the conclusion he reached that the claim for the enforcement of the 
right to just administrative action (as pursued by Chirwa) actually falls within the 
ordinary powers of the High Court, and the fact that the claimant has another claim (to 
enforce rights under the LRA) is irrelevant.160 
 
The position in Chirwa was again adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Kriel v 
Legal Aid Board,161 with the court partly concurring with the ratio in Makhanya. Even 
                                               
153 At par 28 per Nugent JA. 
154 At par 37. 
155 At par 38 - 40. 
156 (2009) 8 BLLR 721 (SCA). This judgment came exactly a year after the decision in Makambi was 
handed down. 
157 At par 29. 
158 Ibid. 
159 At  par 27. 
160 At par 47. 
161 2010 (2) SA 282 (GSJ). 
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though the court held that the dismissal of a public sector employee does not amount to 
administrative action, it still maintained that the findings in Chirwa were inconsistent.162 
 
In Majake v Commission for Gender Equality and Others163 the court completely 
adopted a different approach by holding that the dismissal of a public service employee 
constitutes an administrative action. To amount to an administrative action, the court 
held that the termination of an employment contract must have occurred in terms of a 
statutory power and not in terms of the contract.164  The court also stated that the power 
to appoint also affirms the concomitant power to dismiss and therefore the power to 
dismiss the applicant in this matter involved the exercise of public power.165 
Consequently, the dismissal constituted an administrative action subject to review under 
PAJA.166 
 
It is in Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security & Others (2009) 12 BLLR 1145 (CC) that 
the Constitutional Court attempted to address these inconsistencies. The Court held 
firstly that while the claim in Fredericks “removed it from the purview of labour law”,167 
that could not be the case with Chirwa. Chirwa was a labour matter and it had to be 
resolved through specialised processes (and fora) under the LRA.168 Secondly, it was 
held that the failure by the National and Provincial Commissioners of the SA Police 
Service to promote Mr Gcaba did not amount to an administrative action because it has 
few or no direct implications for other citizens.169 Lastly (and most importantly), to the 
extent that this judgment may be taken to differ from Fredericks and Chirwa, it purported 
to be (the most recent) authority. This authority was accepted by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Mkumatela v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality & Another170 and 
                                               
162 At par 9. It means therefore that when the court decides that it has no jurisdiction, it should not 
continue to consider the merits.  
163 2010 (1) SA 87. 
164 At par 49. See also Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another (2008) (1) SA 
566 at par 63 the court held that the President‟s power to appoint (and dismiss) the head of an agency is 
not sourced from a private law relationship. It is rather an exercise of public authority. 
165 At par 51. 
166 At par 52. 
167 At par 30. 
168 At par 31. 
169 At par 66. 
170 (2010) 2 BLLR 115 (SCA).  
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National Director of Public Prosecutions & another; Tshavungwa v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions & Others171 dealing with promotion and suspension of an employee 
respectively. 
 
The decision in Gcaba was also unequivocally followed by the Labour Court in 
Mabokela v Moretele Local Municipality.172 The Court, in resolving a suspension 
dispute, held that the existence of the right to fair administrative action was doubtful in 
the light of the dictum in Gcaba, in so far as the grievance raised by the employee 
relating to the conduct of the state as employer which has „few or no direct implications 
or consequences for other citizens‟. Consequently, an administrative law remedy was 
not available to the applicant, despite lack of remedy in the LRA for unfair action relating 
to suspension on pay, in terms of the scope of an unfair labour practice in terms of s 
186(2) of the LRA.173 
 
It seems as if the conclusions reached in Chirwa and Gcaba supra accord with an 
observation made by Moseneke DCJ in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape174 that “ it would not only be jurisprudentially inelegant and functionally 
duplicatory to permit remedies under constitutionalised administrative law, and 
remedies under common law, to function side by side. It would be constitutionally 
impermissible.”175 However, Stacey176 attributes some consequences to this “law 
ousting law” approach. Amongst others, he argues that it has the effect of denying the 
constitutional protections of rights to administrative justice where they are nevertheless 
available. Secondly, he submits that it is inconsistent with the principle that the Bill of 
Rights applies to all law in section 8(1) of the Constitution and consequently with the 
principle that law inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid (Section 2 of the 
Constitution). After all these engagements by the courts, one has to wait and see 
whether Gcaba and all its supporting decisions have resolved the problem of forum 
                                               
171 (2010) 2 BLLR 121 (SCA). 
172 (2010) 31 2646 (LC). 
173 At par 12. 
174 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC). 
175 At par 99. 
176 Stacey R: “Administrative Law in Public-Sector Employment Relationships” (2008) 125 SALJ 307. See 
also Plasket J‟s comments in the POPCRU decision above. 
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The jurisdictional issues around compensation of a dismissed employee are intricate 
and it looks like in more areas than one, the High Court will still have an upper hand in 
exercising jurisdiction in what is supposed to be the Labour Court‟s exclusive terrain. To 
further compound the problem, there are provisions within the LRA which run counter to 
the objectives of the Act itself. For instance, Section 195 states that an award or order 
of compensation is in addition to, not a substitute for, any other amount to which the 
employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract of 
employment.177 With a delictual claim for damages in the High Court, an employee will 
surely seek to recover “an amount under any law”, as permitted by Section 195. The 
inevitable result of this practice would be an untenable duplication of remedies in 
respect of the same cause of action.178 An employee can therefore claim compensation 
for unfair dismissal and later approach the High Court to claim damages under either 
the law of contract or delict. 
 
A proper understanding of Section 194 is very imperative in the realisation of the 
objectives of the LRA. It is in this context that the court in Mashava v Cuzen & Woods 
Attorneys179 stated that the capping of compensation “must not be understood as a 
yardstick against which to measure compensation. Rather it is in the nature of a 
guillotine because it cuts off the quantum of her claim when it reaches an amount 
equivalent to 24 months‟ remuneration.”180 
 
                                               
177 See also Section 77(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 which gives concurrent 
jurisdiction to the Labour Court and civil courts in determining matters concerning contracts of 
employment.   
178 See for example SA Maritime Safety Authority v Mckenzie (2010) ILJ 529 (SCA), where the SCA 
allowed a claim for damages for breach of contract notwithstanding the fact that the respondent had 
already claimed compensation for unfair dismissal under the LRA.  
179 (2000) 6 BLLR 691 (LC). 
180 At par 35. 
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It is known that the limitations placed on compensation in the LRA have practical 
advantages for commissioners at the CCMA because evidence is not based on future 
earnings, but simply on the rate of remuneration at the date of dismissal.181 The lack of 
expert witnesses also ensures that finality is reached more swiftly.182 However, it still 
stands to be seen, from the employee‟s perspective, whether Section 194 and its 
benefits will prevail over the financial benefits likely to be gained when the High Court is 
approached under the law of delict.183 Legislative intervention is also imperative in the 
resolution of problems affecting striking employees discussed above. The LRA requires 
judges of the Labour Court to have knowledge, experience and expertise in labour law, 
an advantage which High Court judges do not have. Therefore, to avoid these 
jurisdictional problems a suggestion is made that legislation be enacted to ensure as far 
as possible that all labour matters, if they have to go to a superior court, go to the 
Labour Court.184 
 
 With regard to the interaction of common law (fixed term contracts) and statutory law, 
Van Jaarsveld185 submits that the value of other contractual remedies in contemporary 
employment should not be underestimated. Accordingly, one should venture in the 
direction where contractual remedies are not regarded as exceptions to statutory 
remedies, but rather as co-existing remedies in suitable circumstances.186 Although Du 
Toit187 also argues that the role of common law is not to usurp the role of the legislature, 
he still submits that areas such as dismissal are not areas where the development of 
common law is called for.  
                                               
181 Rycroft and Perumal at 1156. 
182 Ibid. 
183 In the Jacot-Guillamod case, the employee stood a chance of being awarded more than two rand in 
damages in the High Court. If he had instituted an action in the CCMA or the Labour Court under the 
LRA, his compensation may have been limited to a lesser amount in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 194 of the LRA. In SA Maritime Safety Authority v Mckenzie the employee, after reaching a 
settlement of one year‟s salary with the employer, approached the High Court to claim R5, 2 million under 
in damages. 
184 See Langeveldt at par 43. 
185 Van Jaarsveld  The Interplay of Common Law and Statutory Law in Contemporary Law in South 
African Law” (LLD Thesis) 2007 at 615. 
186 Ibid. 
187 See Du Toit D “A common law hydra emerges from the forum shopping swamp” (2010) 31 ILJ 21. Du 





As far as public-sector employment law is concerned, two schools of thought are 
apparent. Firstly, the argument of the majority decision in Chirwa that by leaving Section 
210 of the LRA as it is, the legislature did not want PAJA to interfere with the pre-
eminence of the LRA.188 Secondly, the argument by Langa J in Chirwa that the 
legislature is assumed to have been aware of the resultant conflict between the LRA 
and PAJA.189 Had the legislature intended the LRA to trump PAJA, it would have done 
so in explicit terms.190 Thirdly, there is a view that the LRA and PAJA should be seen as 
complementary and cumulative, as opposed to being destructive of each other. 191 The 
latter view does not enjoy my support for it lends itself to uncertainty. If PAJA and the 
LRA are cumulative, in which forum will disputes over them be entertained? In the 
jurisdictional debate, either the first or second school of thought should prevail. I submit 
that the first view should be upheld because, (i) it will help curb the problem of forum-
shopping and, (ii) it is more in line with the LRA‟s objective of providing for the Labour 
Court (and other institutions) as a one-stop-shop for the resolution of labour disputes. 
                                                 
 











                                               
188 Chirwa at par 50. 
189 Chirwa at par 175. 
190 Ibid. 
191 See POPCRU supra at par 60. 
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                                                 CHAPTER THREE 
 





The Labour Relations Act has brought with it a new era of protection of labour rights, 
marking a departure from pre-constitutional labour law.192 Not only has the LRA 
afforded more protection to employees (individually and collectively) but has also 
created a set of specially crafted forums for the resolution of employment disputes.193 
With the passage of time, practices emerged whereby these institutions were bypassed 
in favour of non-LRA institutions, thus revealing uncertainty and questioning the 
objectives of the LRA and its provisions. For instance, Section 157(2) has resulted in 
problems when determining where the jurisdiction of the Labour Court ends and where 
that of the High Court begins. 
 
The constitutional right to fair labour practices also includes the right to strike,194 which 
is regulated by Chapter IV of the LRA. As clear and concise as the rights in chapter IV 
appear, instances arise during the course of the strike which bring them (statutory laws) 
in conflict with common law jurisprudence.  This chapter discusses areas of statutory 
law that allow for forum shopping. In this regard particular attention will be paid to the 
interpretation of Section 157 of the LRA by the courts and the relation between strikes 
and forum shopping. The review jurisdiction of the Labour Courts and the role it plays in 




                                               
192 Ngcukaitobi T & Brickhill J: “A Difficult Boundary: Public Sector Employment and Administrative Law” 
(2007) 28 ILJ 767.  
193 Ibid. 
194 Section 23(2) (c). 
47 
 
3.2 Section 157 of the Labour Relations Act 
 
3.2.1 Outline and interpretation 
 
Section 157(1) of the LRA reads: “Subject to the Constitution and Section 173 and 
except where this Act provides otherwise, the Labour Court has exclusive195 jurisdiction 
in respect of all matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act or in terms of any other law 
are to be determined by the Labour Court.” The main question provoked by various 
decisions of courts in the jurisdictional debate is whether Section 157(1) ousts the 
jurisdiction of the High Court in deciding employment and labour matters. 
 
In Mondi Paper (A division of Mondi Ltd) v Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union & 
Others, 196 the court had to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court vis-à-vis the 
Labour Court in interdicting employees who engaged in improper picketing. The court 
held that the onus to show that the jurisdiction of the High Court has been ousted (or 
excluded as the wording of Section 157 dictates) is a very heavy one. Nonetheless, the 
Court held that Section 157(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Labour Court, in 
respect of matters that are to be determined by the Labour Court and therefore the High 
Court‟s jurisdiction is ousted. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Fedlife, supra gave a different meaning to Section 
157(1). According to the court, this section does not confer exclusive jurisdiction 
generally on the Labour Court to deal with matters concerning the relationship between 
an employer and an employee. Accordingly, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour 
Court arises only in respect of “matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act or in terms of 
any other law are to be determined by the Labour Court.” Various provisions of the LRA 
                                               
195 The Oxford Concise Dictionary defines the word “exclusive” as “shutting out”, “not admitting of” or 
“excluding all but what is specified.” Therefore, according to this definition section 157(1) excludes all but 
the Labour Court in deciding “matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act are to be determined by the 
Labour Court.” No court has as yet followed the dictionary meaning. Neither has the word “exclusive” 
been at the centre of debate before, but the courts, when engaging in the interpretation of Section 157(1), 
sought in context to determine whether the jurisdiction of the high courts has been excluded by this 
subsection.        
196 (1997) 18 ILJ 84 (D). 
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identify specific disputes that may arise between employers and employees and 
provides for such disputes to be resolved by the Labour Court.197 Those are, according 
to the court, the “matters” contemplated by Section 157(1) and to which the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Labour Court is confined. 
 
The interpretation in Fedlife was followed by the Court in Fredericks & Others v MEC for 
Education and Training, Eastern Cape & Others.198 The Court in this matter had to 
decide whether the Labour Court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine disputes 
concerning alleged infringements of constitutional rights by the state acting in its 
capacity as employer: 
 
As there is no general jurisdiction afforded to the Labour Court in employment 
matters, the jurisdiction of the High Court is not ousted by Section 157(1) simply 
because a dispute is one that falls within the overall sphere of employment 
relations. The High Court‟s jurisdiction will only be ousted in respect of matters 
that “are to be determined” by the Labour Court in terms of the Act.199 
 
The Court went further to elucidate the impact of Section 169 of the Constitution200 on 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court. This section provides that a High Court 
may decide any constitutional matter except a matter that only a Constitutional Court 
may decide or a matter that is assigned by an Act of Parliament201 to another court of a 
status similar to that of a High Court. Since this section formed the basis of the Court a 
quo’s refusal to entertain the matter, the Constitutional Court held that the CCMA is not 
                                               
197 For example Sections 9, 24(7), 26, 59, 63(4), 66(3), 68(1) and 69.  
198 (2002) 2 BLLR 119 (CC). 
199 At par 40. See also United National Public Servants Association of SA v Digomo NO & others ( 
2005)12 BLLR 1169 (SCA). At par 4 the Court held: “The remedies that the Labour Relations Act 
provides against conduct that constitutes an „unfair labour practice‟ are not exhaustive of the remedies 
that might be available to employees in the course of the employment relationship‟‟. 
200 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
201 The Labour Relations Act is one such Act. Section 157(2) of this Act confers on the Labour and High 
Courts concurrent jurisdiction to determine disputes over the constitutionality of any conduct or act 
committed by the state in its capacity as employer.   
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a court of a status similar to that of the High Court as suggested by the reasoning of the 
Court a quo.202 
 
The decisions in both Fedlife and Fredericks supra were followed by the court in Boxer 
Superstores supra with the Court here warning that the ordinary courts should be 
careful not to usurp the Labour Court‟s remedial powers, and their special skills and 
expertise. In a landmark decision of Chirwa, supra, the Constitutional Court implied that 
the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted in labour matters by Section 157(1). 
According to the Court, Section 157(1) [and 157(2)] must be interpreted purposively to 
give effect to the objects of the LRA. The Court, per Skweyiya J, noted:  
 
The purpose of labour law as embodied in the LRA is to provide a 
comprehensive system of dispute resolution mechanisms, forums and remedies 
that are tailored to deal with all aspects of employment. It was envisaged as a 
one-stop shop for all labour-related disputes. The LRA provides for matters such 
as discrimination in the workplace as well as procedural fairness; with the view 
that even if a labour dispute implicates other rights, a litigant will be able to 
approach the LRA structures to resolve the disputes.203  
 
The Court further highlighted the importance of Section 210 of the LRA in interpreting 
the jurisdictional provision. Section 210 provides:  
 
If any conflict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, arises between this 
Act and the provisions of any other law, save the Constitution or any other Act 
expressly amending this Act, the provisions of this Act will prevail.  
 
This section elevates the LRA to a higher position than other legislation in labour 
matters. Only the Constitution itself or legislation expressly amending the LRA can take 
                                               
202 The High Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter because the dispute concerned 
the application of a collective agreement and because the Labour Relations Act requires such disputes to 
be arbitrated by the CCMA.  
203 At par 47. 
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precedence in addressing such labour matters. From this section and the interpretation 
adopted by the Court in Chirwa, supra one can conclude that the forums created by the 
LRA enjoy exclusive jurisdiction (and therefore oust the High Court‟s jurisdiction) in 
labour matters, irrespective of the existence of other rights in the matter.204 The decision 
of the court in Chirwa supra therefore opposed that of Fredericks (and all its followers). 
 
In Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security & Others205 the applicant, after referring the 
matter to a bargaining council, approached the High Court  to review the decision of his 
employer not to appoint (or promote) him to the position of station commissioner. 
Following the interpretation in Chirwa, the high court held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain the application because it related to an employment dispute, thus falling under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour court in terms of Section 157(1). 
 
In casu, the Constitutional Court had to distinguish between the interpretations adopted 
in Fredericks and Chirwa to decide whether indeed the High Court is divested of 
jurisdiction by Section157(1). Contrary to the applicant‟s contention,206 the court was 
more inclined to the purposive interpretation as in Chirwa. At paragraph 69, the court 
echoed the sentiments in Chirwa to find that the Labour Court and other structures have 
been created as a special mechanism to settle labour disputes such as alleged unfair 
dismissals grounded in the LRA and not, for example, applications for administrative 
review as demanded by the applicant in this matter. The court further held: 
 
Section 157(1) confirms that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over any 
matter that the LRA prescribes should be determined by it. That includes, 
amongst other things, reviews of the decisions of the CCMA under section 145. 
Section 157(1) should, therefore, be given an expansive content to protect the 
                                               
204 In Chirwa, supra, the applicant claimed that her administrative law rights under the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 were violated by the dismissal and that being so, the matter had to 
be reviewed by the High Court under PAJA. 
205 See (2009) 12 BLLR 1145 (CC). 
206 The applicant argued accordingly that the High Court erred in holding that it was bound by Chirwa and 
in holding that it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter as Chirwa had overruled Fredericks. 
According to the applicant, the Court should have followed Fredericks.   
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status of the Labour Court [and Section 157(2) should not be read to permit the 
High Court to have jurisdiction over these matters as well].207 
 
To the extent that it differs from Fredericks or Chirwa, Gcaba holds that it is the 
authority208 on this and other jurisdictional issues. Most of these issues are pertinent to 
this chapter. 
 
3.2.2 Problems in Section 157(1) 
 
3.2.2.1 The determining factor 
Section 157(1) provides that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in 
respect of all matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act or in terms of any other 
law are “to be determined by the Labour Court”. The problem with this section 
lies in deciding on which matters are “to be determined by the Labour Court”. 
According to Chirwa209 and Gcaba supra,210 a court is required to assess its 
jurisdiction in the light of the pleadings and not substantive merits. This reasoning 
creates a loophole because it has an effect of allowing litigants to carefully plead 
their cases in a manner that puts those cases outside the [exclusive] jurisdiction 
of the Labour Court.  
The debate of form and substance in jurisdiction was earlier entertained by the 
Labour Appeal Court in Wardlaw v Supreme Mouldings (Pty) Ltd.211 The Court in 
this matter identified two schools of thought212 namely; The Formalistic school of 
though and the Substantive school of thought.  
                                               
207 At par 70. 
208 See the decision in Sibeko v Premier for the Province of the Northern Cape & Another (2010) 2 BLLR 
207 (NCK). The Court acknowledged that the complexities in jurisdictional debate were clarified in Gcaba. 
209 At par 39 and 75. 
210 At par 77. See also Sibeko at par 22 and 75. 
211 (2007) 28 ILJ 1042 (LAC). 
212 Section 191(5)(a) and (b) is central to these schools of thought and  reads as follows: 
„(5)  If a council or a commissioner certifies that the dispute remains unresolved, or if 30 days have 
expired since the council or the commission received the referral and the dispute remains unresolved- 
(a) The council or the commission must arbitrate the dispute at the request of the employee if- 
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The formalistic school of thought entails that the employee would allege what the 
reason for the dismissal is and the reason that he would allege would be a 
reason that falls under Section 191(5) (a) once such an allegation is made, the 
Labour Court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute up to the end even 
if during adjudication the court became convinced that the reason alleged by the 
employee is not the real reason for dismissal. 
According to the court, this school of thought carries the following advantages: 
 It promotes certainty, because to know whether a dispute should be 
referred to arbitration or adjudication, all that needs to be done is to 
determine what the employee alleges is the reason for the dismissal; that 
can be established quickly and without the court‟s having to embark upon 
any kind of protracted enquiry into the true reason for the dismissal which 
may require that oral evidence be heard.213 
 It promotes the expeditious resolution of disputes which is one of the 
primary objects of the Act. This is so because, once the court assumes 
jurisdiction with regard to a dismissal dispute, it retains that jurisdiction 
right up to the end.214 
                                                                                                                                                       
(i) The employee has alleged that the reason for dismissal is related to the employee‟s conduct 
or capacity, unless paragraph (b)(iii) applies; 
(ii) the employee has alleged that the reason for dismissal is that the employer made continued 
employment intolerable or the employer provided the employee with substantially less 
favourable conditions or circumstances at work after a transfer in terms of section 197 or 
197A, unless the employee alleges that the contract of employment was terminated for a 
reason contemplated in section 187; 
(iii) the employee does not know the reason for dismissal; or 
(iv) the dispute concerns an unfair labour practice; or 
       (b)  the employee may refer  the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication if the employee has 
alleged        
              that  the reason for dismissal is – 
 (i) automatically unfair 
               (ii) based on the employer‟s operational requirements; 
               (iii) the employee‟s participation in a strike that does not comply with the provisions of Chapter 
IV; or 
               (iv) because the employee refused to join, was refused membership of or was expelled from a 
trade  union party to a closed shop agreement.‟ 
 
213 At par 11.6. 
214 At par 11.7. 
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 It can also be said to be cost effective because, once there is a trial in a 
particular forum, it proceeds to finality and only the costs of that trial arise 
whereas, where the matter must be referred to another forum after some 
evidence has been led in the one forum, that results in higher costs or 
even a duplication of costs.215 
 Lastly, it is said to be convenient to witnesses because they are called to 
one forum where they give their evidence once and for all and will not later 
be called to give the same evidence in another forum if the court declines 
to proceed to finality with the dispute. 
However, the court noted the following points of criticism216 against this school of 
thought: 
 By having as its foundation a mere allegation (as to the reason for the dismissal), 
which prevails even when it is not true, it  elevates form over substance and that 
goes against our case law which holds the opposite view. 
 This school of thought allows the Labour Court to usurp the jurisdiction of the 
CCMA and bargaining councils when it entertains the merits of dismissal 
disputes where it is clear that the true reason for the dismissal is misconduct or 
incapacity simply because the employee may earlier on have made an untrue 
allegation as to the true reason for the dismissal. The argument here would be 
that whatever happens with regard to the issue of jurisdiction, a clear distinction 
should be made between the roles of the CCMA and bargaining councils, on the 
one hand, and the role of the Labour Court on the other. 
 With regard to the view that this approach may be said to promote the 
expeditious resolution of disputes, the court warned that the significance thereof 
should not be exaggerated. This assertion would be made on the basis that, 
once the Labour Court has adjudicated the merits of a dismissal dispute that 
                                               
215 At par 11.8. 
216 At par 12. 
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ought to have gone to arbitration if the employee had alleged the true reason for 
dismissal, the appellate process which is available to the losing party in the 
Labour Court may, if he appeals, delay the ultimate finalization of the dispute to 
the CCMA for arbitration, that may  well have delayed the dispute, such award 
would be final in terms of the Act and there would be no appeal process to the 
losing party but only a review process. 
 Finally this school of thought may be said to encourage employees to by-pass 
the CCMA and bargaining councils when they prefer their disputes to be heard 
by the Labour Court. 
The rationale behind the substantive school of thought is that the Labour Court should 
only provisionally accept the employee‟s allegation as to the reason for dismissal until it 
makes a finding as to the true reason of dismissal. If the reason it finds is the same 
reason as the one that was alleged by the employee, no problem arises and the court 
proceeds to adjudicate the dispute on the merits. If, however, the reason for dismissal 
that the court finds is not the one alleged by the employee but a reason that falls under 
Section 191(5) (a) of the LRA, the court should refuse to adjudicate the dispute and let it 
be referred to arbitration by the CCMA or a bargaining council with jurisdiction, as the 
case may be. 
In favour of this school of thought it was noted that it gives effect to the different 
processes to which different disputes are subject in terms of the Act and does not blur 
the distinction between disputes that should go to different processes and fora. This 
school of thought was also praised because it prevents employees from bringing to the 
Labour Court dismissal disputes that do not deserve or are not required to be referred to 
the Labour Court. This school has however been criticised for being very costly, for 
unduly delaying the finalization of some disputes and creating duplication of 
processes.217 In Wardlaw, unlike in Chirwa and Gcaba, the court preferred the 
substantive over the formalistic school of thought, and held that it enjoys recognition of 
                                               
217 At par 14. 
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the LRA. Accordingly, Section 157(5)218, read with Section 158(2), clearly envisages a 
situation where the Labour Court takes as correct the employee‟s allegation of what the 
reason for dismissal is and proceeds with the hearing until it is „apparent‟  to it that the 
reason for dismissal is a different one and it is one falling under Section 191(5) (a). In 
such a case Section 158(2)219 is triggered. Once it is clear that to the court that the 
dispute is one that ought to have been taken to arbitration, the court deals with the 
matter in terms of either Section 158 (2)(a) and (b).220 
The powers given to the Labour Court by Wardlaw were also extended to 
commissioners to follow the substantive school of thought when determining 
jurisdiction.221 The Labour Court also confirmed the principles laid down by Wardlaw in 
Chizunza v MTN (Pty) Ltd,222 where it (the Labour Court) had to determine the true 
nature of the dispute in spite of the characterization by the referring party or by the 
CCMA commissioner.223 
 
 3.2.2.2 The delaying effect 
 
The High Court may, for example, decide to rely on the pleadings in order to 
adjudicate a matter which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour 
Court (or any of the LRA institutions). Should the High Court lack jurisdiction to 
hear the matter, a referral will be made to the proper forum. The referral of the 
matter to a competent court may be a convenient way of ensuring that legal 
disputes are resolved. However, this referral would unnecessarily add costs and 
                                               
218 Section 157(5) provides: 
    „(5) Except as provided in section 158(2), the Labour Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate an                          
unresolved dispute if this Act requires the dispute to be resolved through arbitration.‟    
219 Section 158(2) of the Act provides: 
     „(2)   If at any stage after a dispute has been referred to the Labour Court, it becomes apparent that the          
dispute ought to have been referred to arbitration, the Court may- 
 (a) stay the proceedings and refer the dispute to arbitration; or 
 (b) with the consent of the parties and if it is expedient to do so, continue with the proceedings with 
the Court sitting as an arbitrator, in which case the Court may only make any order that a 
commissioner or arbitrator would have been entitled to make‟ 
220 At par 21. 
221 See Chuma and Giflo Enginering (BOP) (Pty) Ltd (2009) 30 ILJ 2572 (BCA). 
222 (2008) 29 ILJ 2919 (LC). 
223 At par 13. 
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cause delay in the finalisation of the matter at hand. Litigants should, therefore, 
be limited to taking their labour matters to the proper LRA structures so that the 
delay and cost of referral can be avoided. Unnecessary delays should be 
avoided as they will defeat the purpose of the LRA.224 This will also assist in 
reducing unnecessary costs that may be incurred during the process of referral. 
 
3.2.3 Concurrent jurisdiction  
 
Section 157(2) of the LRA reads: “The Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the 
High Court in respect of any  alleged or threatened violation of  any fundamental right 
entrenched  in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
arising from :-  
 
a) Employment and from labour relations; 
b) Any dispute over the constitutionality of any executive or administrative act or 
conduct by the state in its capacity as an employer; and 
c) The application of any law for the administration of which the minister is 
responsible.” 
 
This Section has resulted in complex jurisdictional disputes in so far as determining 
where the jurisdiction of the Labour Court ends and where that of the High Court begins. 
In interpreting this section too there were tensions between the judgments of the courts 
in Fredericks and in Chirwa. In Fredericks the Court adopted a literal approach: 
 
There is no express provision of the [Labour Relations] Act affording the Labour 
Court jurisdiction to determine disputes arising from an alleged infringement of 
constitutional rights by the state acting in its capacity as an employer, other than 
Section 157(2). That section provides that challenges based on constitutional 
                                               
224 The Explanatory Memorandum to the draft Bill 115 at 147-151 mentions as one of the objects for 
creating the new system, the need to overcome the lengthy delays inherent in the Industrial Court 
procedure. Section 1(d)(iv) of the LRA mentions the promotion of effective resolution of labour disputes 
as one of its objects. 
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rights arising from the state‟s conduct in its capacity as employer is a matter that 
may be determined by the Labour Court, concurrently with the High Court. 
Whatever else its import, Section 157(2) cannot be interpreted as ousting the 
jurisdiction of the High Court since it expressly provides for a concurrent 
jurisdiction.225 
 
In Chirwa, supra the applicant, a dismissed public sector employee, sought to bypass 
the LRA procedures (arbitration in particular) and take the dispute to the High Court. 
The applicant relied on Section 157(2) in contending that the High Court has concurrent 
jurisdiction with the Labour Court in respect of her claim, thus prompting the Court to 
consider the scope of this section. The Constitutional Court held that Section 157(2) 
must be given a purposive interpretation: That is, the courts must be guided by the 
primary objectives of the LRA when deciding whether the High Court has concurrent 
jurisdiction with the Labour Court to decide a particular dispute. The objects of the LRA 
are twofold: 
 
 (a) To establish a comprehensive framework of law governing the labour and    
employment relations between employees and employers in all sectors, and 
(b) To establish the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court as superior courts 
with exclusive jurisdiction to determine all matters arising from the LRA. 
 
In line with these objects, Section 157(2) should therefore be understood as not giving 
the High Courts jurisdiction to deal with employment matters, but rather as conferring 
limited constitutional jurisdiction to the Labour Court in respect of matters involving 
alleged violations of the rights in the Bill of Rights. The main purpose of section 157(2) 
was to confer constitutional jurisdiction on the Labour Court. The Labour Court therefore 
has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any fundamental right entrenched in chapter 2 of 
the Constitution arising from employment and labour relations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
                                               
225 At par 41. 
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In Gcaba, supra the Court adopted the same approach as in Chirwa. The Court held 
accordingly that the purpose of Section 157(2) is to extend the jurisdiction of the Labour 
Court to embrace disputes arising from employment involving violations of fundamental 
rights. However, the court further warned that Section 157(2), so interpreted, must not 
be taken to mean that the High Court is divested of jurisdiction where a cause of action 
and remedy lies within its jurisdiction.226 Therefore, to the extent that Gcaba is different 
from Chirwa or Fredericks, it is law. 
 
3.3 Strikes and Forum Shopping 
 
Section 64 of the LRA gives to every employee the right to strike, and to employers the 
recourse to lock-out. The Act further states that participation in a protected strike or 
lock-out does not amount to a defect or breach of contract227 and also exempts 
employees and employers from civil legal proceedings for taking part in these forms of 
industrial action.228 However, the Act also states clearly that the abovementioned 
provisions do not apply if the act concerned constitutes an offence.229 This issue 
inevitably leads to the following question: which courts have jurisdiction when offences 
(civil and criminal) are committed during the course of strikes and lock-outs?    
 
The first attempt at answering this question was made by the High Court in Mondi Paper 
(A Division of Mondi Ltd) v Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union & Others.230 
The Court was asked by the employer to grant an interdict against employees who, 
during the course of picketing, committed acts of sabotage and intimidating non-striking 
employees. In its argument, the employer contended that the incidents complained of in 
the matter were purely delictual issues and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the 
                                               
226 At par 74. The Court held that the LRA does not intend to destroy causes of action or remedies and 
section 157 should not be interpreted to do so. Where a remedy lies in the High Court or the Equality 
Court, Section 157(2) cannot be read to mean that it no longer lies there and should not be read to mean 
as such. 
227 Section 67(2). 
228 Section 67(6). 
229 Section 67(8). 
230 (1997) 18 ILJ 84 (D). 
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High Court. The High Court did not agree with this argument. Nicholson J held that the 
High Court has no jurisdiction because: 
 
The actions of the offending employees fall within the purview of the powers of 
the Labour Court. The incidents relating to the intimidation of non-striking 
employees at home are still examples of improper demonstrating in support of a 
strike. They are, moreover, necessary and incidental to a resolution of that 
dispute. In any event the notion that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction 
for that limited purpose and that the other incidents which constitute improper 
picketing pure and simple should be referred to the Labour Court offends against 
the court‟s duty to avoid proliferation and multiplicity of court proceedings with 
their attendant costs.231 
 
The Judge further rejected the employer‟s argument that the dispute was a 
consequence of ordinary delictual conduct and it bore no relation to the objects and 
remedies in the LRA. He made the following observation: 
 
The Act does not, of course, give the Labour Court jurisdiction to every dispute 
involving workers near a factory. The Supreme Court might willingly give its 
attention to a wronged wife, who is assaulted by her husband outside the factory 
gates, when asking for maintenance. That would be a delictual action which did 
not concern the Labour Court. In casu the whole background, the presence of a 
trade union, the recognition agreement, the wage bargaining dispute, which was 
incidentally referred to the CCMA, the notice of intention to strike and dispute 
about compliance with s 64 of the Act all clearly stamp the jurisdictional milieu as 
belonging to the machinery of the Act and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court.232  
 
This reasoning formed the basis of a number of subsequent decisions. In Sappi Fine 
Papers (Pty)(Ltd) (Adamas Mill) v Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union & 
                                               
231 At  par 90 D-E. 
232 Ibid at F-H. 
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Others233 the applicant (the employer) sought an order in the form of a rule nisi in the 
High Court, to evict employees who, in the course of a protected strike, embarked on 
disruptive and intimidatory ‘toyi-toyi’ processions. A challenge was brought to the 
jurisdiction of the High Court by the respondents on the basis, firstly that the Labour 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to grant relief sought by the applicant and secondly, that 
the High Court has no jurisdiction to grant any relief to any alleged unlawful conduct 
committed during the course of a picket or to grant any relief which in any way relates to 
the powers of the CCMA with regard to the determination of picketing rules.234 
 
The applicant, after accepting that the Labour Court had jurisdiction, disputed that the 
Labour Court had exclusive jurisdiction to grant the relief it sought, regardless of the 
provisions of Section 157(1) of the Act. The applicant argued in essence that in terms of 
the outline and the provisions of the Act there are, on the one hand, “protected strikes” 
and, on the other, strikes which do not comply with the provisions of the Act. Strikes 
which do not comply with the Act are therefore not covered by the Act and are not within 
the reach of the Labour Court. With reference to the provisions of subsections (2), (6) 
and (8) of s 67 of the Act, it was further argued on behalf of the applicant that it was 
apparent from these provisions that, even in the case of a protected strike, unlawful 
activity constituting an offence remains a delict or breach of contract and is subject to 
civil legal proceedings.235 
 
Again, it was contended for the applicant that Sections 67, 68 and 69 made it clear that 
unlawful activity is not promoted, that picketing must be understood to constitute a 
peaceful demonstration and that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court, in so far 
as the granting of interdicts or restraining orders is concerned, is restricted to such 
orders in respect of persons partaking in a strike or in conduct in contemplation or in 
furtherance of a strike; that a strike in that context relates to and is limited to a refusal to 
work or the retardation or obstruction of work, in the sense of non-criminal activity, and 
                                               
233 (1998)19 ILJ 246 (SE). 
234 At par 248 I-J. 
235 At par 256 A-C. 
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that unlawful activity in the protected strike remains subject to the jurisdiction of the High 
Court.236 
 
In the light of these submissions, the court held that the purpose of Section 68 of the act 
is to bring strikes complained of in this matter within the ambit of the Act.237 In 
agreement with the judgment of Nicholson J in the Mondi case Nepgen J held that: 
 
When one has regard to the general scheme of the Act it appears [to me] to be 
inconceivable that the legislature intended that the Labour Court should have 
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of only those matters referred to in Section 68(1) 
of the Act, particularly when it is borne in mind that Section 68 deals with strikes 
which do not comply with the provisions of chapter IV of the Act. If Section 68 
had not been enacted, such strikes, which are not strikes held in terms of the Act, 
would fall outside the provisions of the Act and therefore only the High Court 
would have jurisdiction to make orders in relation thereto. Section 68 of the Act 
ensures that the Labour Court does not only have exclusive jurisdiction, which 
provided for in Section 157(1) of the Act, in respect of protected strikes, but that it 
also has exclusive jurisdiction, to the extent provided for in Section  68, in respect 
of other strikes.238   
 
Nonetheless the court refrained from expressing an opinion on the jurisdiction of the 
Labour Court to entertain the issue of intimidation of non-striking employees at their 
homes.239 The decisions in the Mondi and Sappi cases were followed by the court in 
Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd v SA National Union for Security Officers & Other 
Workers & others240 where the applicant employer insisted on the restrictive 
interpretation of the word „furtherance‟ in Sections 68 of the Act, in order to bring the 
                                               
236 Ibid at E-G. 
237 At par 257 F-G. 
238 At par 258 C- E. 
239 At par 259 D. 
240 (1998) 19 ILJ 43 (C). 
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conduct of the employees241 in this case within the jurisdiction of the High Court. It was 
argued accordingly that since Section 67 purports to give effect to the right to strike, the 
protections conferred in the section should not be interpreted widely to encapsulate 
conduct that goes beyond what is reasonable for the achievement of this purpose. It 
was further argued that Section 68 should also be restrictively interpreted to exclude 
conduct which has occurred during the course of a strike but which was not in 
furtherance thereof.242 The Court held that the restrictive interpretation of the word 
„furtherance‟ in Section 68 was not warranted. King DJP explained that in Section 68 the 
legislature has established the Labour Court (and the Labour Court only) with a 
framework for the control and prevention of illegal strikes and conduct concomitant 
therewith.243 He further stated that the fact that a strike as defined means not only a 
refusal to work but also a retardation or obstruction thereof, it therefore followed that 
„furtherance‟ should be understood to mean “any conduct which is engaged in during 
the course of a strike, is pursuant thereto  and serves to advance it.”244 Again, to 
interpret „furtherance‟ restrictively would contradict the clear intention of the legislature 
and further create a duality of jurisdictions-“a veritable mish-mash.”245 The Labour Court 
thus had exclusive jurisdiction to interdict the conduct of the striking employees in this 
matter. 
 
Another test for determining the jurisdiction of the appropriate court to decide on the 
conduct of the parties during a strike action was laid down in Fourways Mall (Pty) Ltd & 
Another v SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union.246 This test was mainly 
provoked by the fact that an unlawful conduct was not directed at the employer per se 
but at a third party. The applicant companies in this case were registered owners and 
landlords of two shopping centres at which Edgars Ltd was a tenant. The respondents 
were unions whose Ltd members were in the employ of Edgars Ltd. In consequence of 
                                               
241 The respondent employees were interdicted from entering the premises of the applicant (employer) 
after they blockaded and prevented access to the applicant‟s premises by employees, clients and 
prospective employees and clients of the applicant. They also assaulted the said employees and clients 
and interfered with the applicant‟s assets in transit. 
242 At par 47 D-E. 
243 At par 48 B-C. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid at H. 
246 (1999) 20 ILJ 1008 (W). 
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a wage dispute between Edgars Ltd and its employees, the employees interfered with, 
intimidated, verbally and physically abused the applicant‟s customers and also blocked 
the shopping entrances. When the applicant approached the High Court for an interdict, 
the respondents questioned the High Court‟s jurisdiction to entertain the matter.  
 
Addressing this jurisdictional issue, Classen J commented as follows: 
 
It is common cause in the present instance that labour relations exist between 
the members of the two respondents and Edgars Ltd. However, no such labour 
relation exists between the respondents and/or its members on the one side and 
the applicants on the other. It is also common cause that the individuals whose 
conduct is complained of are in fact all members of the two respondents. The 
applicants in this case are common law owners of the shopping centres. They 
have no relationship whatsoever with the members of the two respondents, either 
in contract or by statute. The nature of the dispute between them arises out of 
the law of delict as well as the law of contract.247 
 
After considering the purpose of the LRA in Section 1, the court observed that the 
protection of an owner‟s common law property rights does not feature anywhere in the 
Act, neither is the owner‟s right included in this exposition. The purpose of the Act is 
based on the relationship between the employer and employee and with such a 
relationship being absent, the High Court has jurisdiction to decide the dispute.248 
 
 In Minister of Correctional Services & Another v Ngubo & Others,249 there was no strike 
but the respondent employees engaged in unlawful acts. They, amongst other things, 
assaulted, molested and intimidated a Provincial Commissioner, with the intention of 
removing her from her office. The employer and the commissioner approached the then 
Natal Provincial Division for an order restraining and interdicting the respondents from 
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their unlawful conducts, to which the respondents objected by submitting that this was a 
labour matter which fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. 
 
The Court held in principle that for the Labour Court to exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
there has to exist a direct relationship between the matter or the dispute before it and a 
particular relevant aspect and objective of the Act.250 According to the court, the 
respondents‟ conduct was aimed at removing the incumbent commissioner from her 
position as opposed to resolving a dispute in respect of any matters of mutual interest 
between employer and employee.251 The actions of the respondents were not in 
pursuance of a strike action and the fact that they resulted in obstruction or retardation 
of work was incidental and not connected in any way with the object of the Act.  
 
 
The direct relationship as a test for determining jurisdiction was questioned by the court 
in Langeveldt supra. Zondo JP submitted that if Levinsohn J‟s conclusion that there was 
no direct relationship between the conduct of the parties and the objectives of the Act 
was correct, then there would rather be inconsistencies between the conduct of the 
parties and the objectives of the LRA.252 Firstly, the actions of the employees 
undermined labour peace and secondly, it ran contrary to the Act‟s objective of 
                                               
250  At par 318 A. 
251  Ibid at J. This distinction was also made by the Court in Jacot -Guillarmod supra, where Le Roux J 
refused reliance on Mondi because it was about strike action whereas Jacot-Guillarmod was about an 
enforcement of a common law contract. 
252 Section 1 of the LRA reads: 1. The purpose of this act is to advance economic development, social 
justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the objectives of this Act which 
are- 
(a) to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by Section 27 of the Constitution; 
(b) to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International 
Labour Organisation; 
(c) to provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions, employers and employer‟s 
organisations can- 
(i) collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions of employment and other 
matters of mutual interest; and  
(ii) formulate  industrial policy; and 
(d) to promote- 
(i) orderly collective bargaining; 
(ii) collective bargaining at sectoral level; 
(iii) employee participation in decision-making in the workplace; 
and 
(iv) the effective resolution  of labour disputes. 
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promoting effective resolution of labour disputes.253 Another question that arises is 
whether the Labour Court would have jurisdiction if, in the Ngubo case, the applicant for 
the interdict was the official concerned and not the employer. It does not seem, in my 
opinion, like the matter would end up with the High Court only for the lack of an 
employer-employee relationship. With regard to the Fourways case, the following 
jurisdictional problems arise: 
 
 Section 67(2) states that a person commits neither a delict nor a breach of 
contract by engaging in a protected strike (or lock-out) or any conduct in 
contemplation of a protected strike (or lock-out). Again, by virtue of Section 
67(6) civil legal proceedings would not be pursued against the employees in 
this case. The Labour Court would therefore be well-placed to deal with the 
conduct of the employees in this matter- at least in so far as they did not 
constitute criminal offences254, but for acts such as intimidation, physical and 
verbal abuse and damage to property, the High Court‟s jurisdiction is 
unquestionable. 
 Section 69 deals with picketing and subsection 4 states that upon request by 
the union or the employer, the CCMA must attempt to secure an agreement 
between the parties to the dispute on rules that should apply in relation to the 
strike or lock-out. Any material breach of Section 69 must be taken to the 
CCMA in terms of Section 69(8) which must attempt to resolve the dispute by 
conciliation.255 If a dispute remains unresolved, then the parties may refer it to 
the Labour Court for adjudication. Therefore, the civil litigation in Fourways 
could have been avoided by applying Section 69 as cited above. 
However, because of the absence of the relationship either between the parties as the 
applicants and strikes or between the dispute and any object of the LRA, it seems as if 
parties who find themselves in the position of the applicants in both the Ngubo and 
                                               
253 At par 29-30. 
254 Section 67 (8) reads: The provisions of subsections (2) and (6) do not apply to any act in 
contemplation or in furtherance of a strike or a lock-out, if that act is an offence. A mere act of picketing or 
seeking support from members of the public does not attract criminal or civil liability.                                      
255 Section 69 (10). 
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Fourways cases will not be availed of remedies, for acts that constitute criminal 
offences and wrongs under civil law. This will lead to an untenable situation where two 
courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate an action which occurred at the same time, same 
place and by the same people. The same problem will occur when the matters are 
taken on appeal. For instance, the SCA and the LAC will hear different appeals in what 
is essentially the same dispute. The worst that could happen is to have these courts 
give different decisions, which are eventually taken to the Constitutional Court. The 
objectives of developing a coherent system of law and promotion of effective resolution 
of labour disputes would be hindered by these practices. 
 
3.4 Review Jurisdiction of the Labour Court 
 
No appeal lies against an arbitration award issued by the CCMA. The LRA provides for 
review as the only remedy to a litigant who is dissatisfied with the award. There is an 
established and fundamental distinction between appeal and review. A court of appeal 
makes a finding on the merits of the case before it; if it decides that the decision of the 
lower court or tribunal was wrong. Then it sets that decision aside and lays down what it 
believes to be the correct judgment. 
 
By contrast, the court or tribunal in judicial review cannot set aside a decision merely 
because it believes that the decision was wrong on the merits.256 A reviewing court or 
tribunal is only concerned with the lawfulness of the process by which the decision was 
arrived at, and can set it aside only if that process was flawed in certain defined and 
limited respects. In Coetzee v Lebea No & Another 257 Cheadle AJ dealt with this 
distinction in the following manner:  
                                               
256 In Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & Others, supra, the Court held that the reviewing court might 
sometimes find itself dealing with the merits of the case, something that might of course have the effect of  
blurring the line between appeal and review. The court held that this effect can be avoided as long as the 
judge who enters the merits is aware that he or she does so not in order to substitute his or her own 
opinion on the correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is rationally justifiable. See also 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Others (2004)7 BCLR 687 (CC) where 
the Court held that in judging a decision for reasonableness (during review proceedings), it is impossible 
to separate merits from scrutiny. However, the Court still emphasised the significance of the distinction 
between appeals and reviews.     




It seems to me that the seeds of the distinction lie in the phrase so commonly 
used to describe a process failure in the reasoning phase of a tribunal‟s 
proceedings-„the failure to apply one‟s mind‟. That test is different from the one 
that applies to an appeal-namely, whether another court could come to a different 
conclusion. Accordingly once a reviewing court is satisfied that the tribunal has 
applied its mind, it will not interfere with the result even if it would have come to a 
different conclusion.258 
 
 The review powers of the Labour Court are dealt with in Sections 145, 158(1)(g), 
158(h) and 157(3).259 Section 145 affords to any party to a dispute who alleges a defect 
in any arbitration proceedings, a right to apply to the Labour Court for an order setting 
aside the arbitration award. This section further outlines the time periods within which 
this application can be made.260 In contrast to this section, Section 158(1) (g) states: 
“The LC may, despite Section 145, review the performance or purported performance of 
any function provided for in this Act or any act or omission of any person or body in 
terms of this Act on any grounds that are permissible in law”. In practice Section 
158(1)(g) had an adverse effect on Section 145 for the following reasons: 
 
a) Unlike Section 145 which specifies the time limit within which an application should 
be lodged, Section 158(1)(g) specifies no time limit; and  
b) Whereas Section 145 limits the application for review to a few procedural grounds, 
the application under Section 158(1)(g) can be based on “any ground permissible in 
law”.  
Moreover, the wording of Section 158(1)(g) rendered Section 145 less useful and this is 
suggested by the following differences between these two sections: 
                                               
258 At par 10. 
259 Section 158(1)(h) gives the Labour Court the powers to review a decision or act by the State in its 
capacity as employer and Section 157(3) deals with review of arbitration awards in disputes that may be 
referred to arbitration  in terms of the LRA but which have been arbitrated under the Arbitration Act 42 of 
1965. 
260 This application can be made (i) Within six weeks of the date that the award was served on the 
applicant, unless the alleged defect involves corruption; or (ii) If the alleged defect involves corruption, 




 Section 145 specifies a six week‟s time limit within which an application should 
be brought, whereas Section 158(1)(g) specifies no time limit. 
 Section 145 defines specific procedural grounds upon which the review may be 
brought, while Section 158(1)(g) broadly mentions “any grounds that are 
permissible in law”. 
 
The nature and extent of this review was addressed by the LAC in Carephone Pty Ltd v 
Marcus NO & Others.261 Froneman DJP made the following interpretation: 
 
It must be admitted that the choice of the word „despite‟ in Section 158(1)(g) is an 
unhappy one. It allows for an interpretation of Section 158(1)(g) as granting a 
general review power to the Labour Court over any function, act or omission 
under the LRA, instead of its providing merely for the court‟s residual powers of 
review for administrative functions not specifically defined in Sections145 and 
158(1)(h). If the latter interpretation is accepted, the provisions of Sections 145, 
158(1)(g) and 128(1)(h) apply to distinct and different forms of administrative 
action and do not overlap. If, however, the former interpretation is accepted, the 
fields of application of Sections 145 and 158(1) do overlap with the result that the 
provisions of Section 145 become superfluous.262   
 
The Court further explained that Section 158(1)(g) does not apply to the review of 
arbitration awards made by commissioners of the CCMA. This section is a residual 
power to review administrative action. As a result, the word “despite” in Section 158(1) 
(g) should read as “subject to”. It is a lesser evil than ignoring the whole of Section 145, 
including its sensible provisions relating to time-limits.263In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court had to determine the following: 
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 Whether Section 33264 of the Constitution was applicable to arbitration awards 
made by commissioners of the CCMA and 
 Whether the limited grounds in Section 145 were in conflict with Section 33. 
 
As far as the applicability of Section 33 to arbitration awards is concerned, the Court 
held that the issuing of an arbitration award by the CCMA constituted an administrative 
action as contemplated in Section 33 read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6 to the 
Constitution,265 and as such the award has to meet the requirement of rationality. The 
court held further that the CCMA is a public institution created by statute and exercises 
public powers and functions. Consequently, the CCMA is an organ of State in terms of 
the Constitution and therefore bound directly by the Bill of Rights and the basic values 
and principles governing public administration, including Section 33 read with Item 23(2) 
of Schedule 6 in the Constitution which deals with just administrative action. 
 
As to the question of Section 145 of the LRA, conflicting with Section 33 of the 
Constitution, it was held that there was nothing in the LRA that permits a commissioner 
in arbitration proceedings to exceed the bounds of „constitutional constraints‟ in the 
Constitution, and that the words of the LRA must be read in a way consistent with the 
Constitution and not in a manner that would render Section 145 less useful. The 
grounds of review in Section 145 were consequently not in conflict with Section 33 of 
the Constitution.266 
                                               
264 Section 33 of the Constitution deals with the right to just administrative action and provides that: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to just administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
(2) everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given 
written reasons.” 
265 Item 23(2) of Schedule 6 provides that: 
“until the legislation envisaged in Sections 32(2) and 33(3) of the new Constitution is enacted: 
(a) Sections 33(1) and (2) must be regarded to read as follows: 
Every person has the right to- 
a)lawful administrative action where any of their rights or interests is affected or threatened; 
b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of their rights or legitimate  expectations is affected or 
threatened; 
c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action which affects any of their rights or interests 
unless the reasons for that action have been made public; and 
d) administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it where any of their rights is 
affected or threatened.” 
266 At par 37-38, the Court formulated an additional test for the standard to be employed when 




Hoexter267 mentions the following as the limitations of review as a post-remedial 
mechanism of administrative action:  Firstly she describes review as marginal and 
peripheral for three reasons:  
- It leaves out of account many administrative matters that are not amenable to 
resolution by a court of law;  
- there is no certainty that administrators learn from the case-law or that they 
generally modify their behaviour in response to what the reviewing judges say 
about it- or worse, that they may modify their behaviour in entirely undesirable 
ways, by adopting defensive practices designed to minimize the risk of challenge 
rather than improve the quality of their decisions; and 
- the outcome of judicial review is often unhelpful to applicants.  
 
Secondly, Hoexter describes review as backward-looking because, instead of building 
up a positive, prospective picture of what good administration should be, it focuses on 
past maladministration. She consequently argues for an integrated administrative 
system-free of judicial interference.268 
 
In support of the above (albeit in a different way), Bezuidenhout269 argues that the 
compulsory nature of the provisions of the LRA insofar as the resolution of the majority 
of disputes is concerned, should be tampered with by allowing an aggrieved party 
maximum protection which, according to her, can be assured by either allowing a right 
of appeal or widening the grounds of review provided for in Section 145. I submit that 
the argument with regard to allowing for appeals is not viable because it will multiply 
dispute resolution processes and run counter to the LRA‟s objective of expedience. This 
move may also not be cost-effective. However, widening the grounds of review may 
                                                                                                                                                       
the “justifiability” or “rationality” test. According to this test a question has to be asked whether there is “a 
rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the administrative decision maker between the 
material properly available to him and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at.” According to the 
Court, only judicial officers will be able to give more specific content to the broad concept of justifiability in 
the context of the review provisions of the LRA. 
267 Hoexter C : “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law.” (2000) 117 SALJ 484. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Bezuidenhout S A: The powers of the Labour Court to review arbitration awards of the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration: A Comparative Study. (LLM Dissertation) 2004. 
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benefit parties to a labour dispute because it will give them further recourse and it will 
help   prevent the civil courts from hearing labour matters, thus adding to the 




In this chapter the interaction between jurisdictional provisions of the LRA were 
discussed. To some courts, Section 157 (1) of the LRA ousts the jurisdiction of the High 
Courts to decide labour matters270 while to some, it only confers general jurisdiction to 
the Labour Courts in “matters that elsewhere in terms of the LRA or in terms of any 
other law are to be determined by the Labour Court.”271 The need for law reform in 
addressing the problem of forum shopping cannot be overemphasised; hence, the 
different suggestions put forth by case law and academic opinion. For instance, there is 
a view that suggests that Section 157(2) should be interpreted purposively to give effect 
to the primary objectives of the LRA,272 and those that call for the legislature to revisit 
Section 157(2).273 In line with the latter view, I submit that coherence and certainty can 
best be achieved by the deletion of Section 157(2) from the LRA. 
 
The jurisdictional issues surrounding strike actions and the review of compulsory 
arbitrations by the Labour Court are also problematic but as will be apparent in the next 
chapter, the adoption of the Superior Courts Bill might be helpful in addressing those 
issues. 
                        





                                               
270 See Mondi Paper, supra for example. 
271 See Fedlife, supra for example. 
272 See Ngcobo J‟s decision in Chirwa. 
273 See Skweyiya J‟s decision in Chirwa at par 71. 
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                                           CHAPTER FOUR 
 
           RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESOLUTION OF FORUM SHOPPING 
 
4.1 Research question answered 
 
The LRA has its successes and shortcomings. At the CCMA level, the objectives of the 
LRA with regard to cheap and easily accessible processes, as well as simplicity have 
been achieved. In 1998, three years after its establishment, the CCMA received an 
average of 323 cases every working day.274 In 2006 that number grew to 500 per day 
and the resolution rate was over 10%.275 In the 2010 financial year this case load 
increased by 17%.276 This shows how easily accessible the commission has been over 
the years. The absence of pleadings and complicated referral procedures also ensured 
simplicity in the CCMA proceedings.  
 
However, the CCMA processes have had their fair share of failures. The shortage of 
financial and human resources failed to match the exponential case growth that the 
commission experienced over the years and this in effect led to delays in the settlement 
of disputes. The objective of being expeditious has been eventually hampered by these 
shortcomings. I therefore propose that in order to resolve these problems, private 
dispute resolution mechanisms be resorted to, with the CCMA serving as a fallback 
measure where necessary. 
 
The lack of a right to appeal as discussed in Chapter Three is ideal and in line with the 
objectives of the LRA, but has led to some problems in arbitration processes. The 
responsibility for resolving collective industrial disputes lies, generally speaking, with the 
parties involved in the dispute itself, reflecting the principles of autonomy and 
voluntarism, which are important features of genuine collective bargaining and freedom 
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of association.277 The parties to the dispute usually enjoy a great deal of latitude in 
settling their own disputes and in deciding upon the strategies for doing so, either 
through direct negotiation, conciliation, mediation or arbitration, or even through the use 
of industrial action.278 If, however, the resolution process is imposed upon the parties, 
some form of post-remedial relief (in the form of an appeal) is to be expected.  
 
Brand279 further submits that the parties in a compulsory setting such as the arbitration 
under the LRA need to be able to challenge the decision of the imposed arbitrator. He 
further argues that this is not only demanded by the dictates of fairness and legitimacy, 
but it will also enhance the quality and consistency of arbitration as a dispute resolution 
process.280 This argument sounds ideal but, like other schools of thought that support 
the idea of appeals in arbitration processes, I submit that it is misplaced. The essence 
of arbitration is that disputes should be disposed of speedily (without unnecessary 
costs) and  allowing for appeals in arbitration processes will amount to no more than a 
proliferation of dispute resolution processes and negate the LRA‟s objective of 
establishing simple, expedient and cost-effective mechanisms of settling labour 
disputes.  
 
At the level of courts, the LRA did not make as much success as the drafters would 
have contemplated. A multitude of cases discussed in the previous chapters has shown 
a contradiction of intentions by the legislature and eventually casting doubt upon the 
Labour Courts as „a one-stop-shop for all labour-related disputes.281 Through the 
application of administrative law and common law of contract, the Labour Court found 
itself battling for its “exclusive jurisdiction”282 with the High Court, thanks to the 
existence of concurrent jurisdiction. The failure of the courts to bring clarity also 
intensified the jurisdictional conflict. For instance, the lack of boldness by the court in 
Gcaba to decide whether Chirwa overruled Fredericks left open the possibility (and 
                                               
277 Collective Dispute Resolution through Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration: European and ILO 
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279 Brand: “CCMA: Achievements and Challenges- Lessons from the First Three Years” (2000) 21 ILJ 77. 
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281 See Chirwa above. 
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indeed a good opportunity) for employees to frame their disputes as administrative 
matters and approach the High Court for relief. The views of the courts that call for the 
scrapping of Section 157 (2) of the LRA and Section 77(3) of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act283 are noteworthy. The rationale behind this notion is that the High 
Court can be divested of its jurisdiction in labour matters, thus allowing it to focus on 
other legal issues.284 This proposed solution would also have been helpful (albeit to 
some extent) if the Superior Courts Bill of 2003 (discussed below) became a success, 
because the High Court will then not compete with Labour Courts for jurisdiction. 
 
For the LAC, the centre did not hold either. In NEHAWU v University of Cape Town,285  
the Constitutional Court held that it has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the LAC. The 
court held that the provisions of the LRA which equate the LAC with the SCA and clothe 
it with final appellate powers can have no application in constitutional matters. Those 
provisions can only find application in those provisions that fall within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the LC and LAC. Ngcobo J observed that the starting point is the 
Constitution.286 The Constitution recognizes only two courts of appeal namely, the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court Appeal- and to each specific jurisdiction 
has been assigned. The Constitutional Court is the highest court of appeal in all 
constitutional matters while the SCA exercises the highest powers in all but 
constitutional matters. Ngcobo J concluded therefore that an appeal does lie to the 
SCA. Nonetheless litigants are not prevented by anything from directly approaching the 
Constitutional Court if issues of principle are raised. 
 
Rubbing salt in the LAC‟s wounds was the decision of the SCA in NUMSA & Others v 
Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd.287 The Court, in deciding whether the SCA has jurisdiction to 
                                               
                              283 This Section Reads: 77(3) “The Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts to hear 
and determine any matter concerning a contract of employment, irrespective of whether                                                                                                                                         
any basic condition of employment constitutes a term of that contract.” 
284 See Langeveldt at par 68. 
285 (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC). See also the decision of the SCA in Chevron Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Nkambule  
& others (2004) 3 BLLR 214 (SCA).The Court, per Farlam JA held that litigants are entitled to appeal 
against the decision of the old Industrial Court at the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
286 At par 21. 
287 (2005) 5 BLLR 430 (SCA). 
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entertain appeals from the LAC, measured the jurisdictional provisions in the LRA 
against the Constitution. Firstly, section 166(4) provides that the Labour Appeal Court 
enjoys appellate jurisdiction against orders and final judgments of the Labour Court in 
matters over which the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction. Section 167(1) 
establishes the LAC as a court of law and equity,288 whereas Section 173(1) provides 
for the jurisdiction of the LAC:  
 
“Subject to the Constitution and despite any other law, the Labour Appeal Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction- 
(a) to hear and determine all appeals against the final judgments and orders of 
the Labour Court; and 
(b) to decide any question of law reserved…” 
 
The SCA described these provisions as a legislative endeavor to clothe the LAC with 
final appellate powers. However, the court noted that these powers are still subject to 
the Constitution289 and it is only in accordance with the Constitution that they must be 
interpreted.290 The Court observed that Section167(3) for instance, read in light of the 
Constitution merely describes an equivalence of “authority, inherent powers and 
standing” between the SCA and LAC with regards to matters within their respective 
jurisdictions, without depriving the SCA of its role and function as “the highest Court of 
appeal except in constitutional matters”.291 The Court therefore concluded that an 
appeal lies from the LAC to the SCA in all matters, constitutional and non-constitutional. 
It was further emphasized that if the LRA creates a final court of appeal in labour-related 
                                               
288 Sub-sections (2) and (3) read:  
“(2) The Labour Appeal Court is the final court of appeal in respect of all judgments and orders made by 
the Labour Court in respect of the matters within its exclusive jurisdiction. 
(3) The Labour Appeal Court is a superior court that has authority, inherent powers and standing, in 
relation to matters under its jurisdiction.”   
289 Section 168(3) of the Constitution reads:  
“The Supreme Court of Appeal may decide appeals in any matter. It is the highest court of appeal except 
in constitutional matters, and may decide only- 
(a) appeals; 
(b) issues connected with appeals; and 
(c) any other matter that may be referred to it in circumstances defined by an Act of 
Parliament.” 
290 At par 9.The provisions expressly state themselves to be “subject to the Constitution”. 
291 At par 25. 
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matters to the exclusion of the SCA‟s appellate powers, then it would mean that the 
legislature could also create final courts of appeal also in other areas of law-crime, 
welfare, environment, family law and administrative matters, thereby assigning 
piecemeal the jurisdiction of the SCA to one or more appellate tribunals of similar 
authority.292  
 
4.2 The Prevention of Forum Shopping 
 
4.2.1 Lessons from Legislation 
 
The jurisdictional conflict between the Labour Courts and ordinary courts as discussed 
above point towards the failure of the Labour Courts‟ structure and in effect renders 
change inevitable. The legislature, through two versions of the Superior Courts Bill, has 
taken an initiative to bring this change by proposing the re-organization of the Labour 
Courts.  Section 2 of the 2003 Bill reads: (1) “The objects of this Act are- 
 
(a) to bring the structure of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and the High Courts of South Africa into line with the provisions of Chapter 8 of 
the Constitution; 
(b) to make provision for the adjudication of labour matters by the High Court and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal ; and 
(c) to consolidate and rationalise the laws pertaining to those courts.” 
 
In effect the Bill sought to abolish the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court. 
Jurisdiction in labour matters would be bestowed on the High Court whilst labour 
appeals would be handled by the Supreme Court of Appeal. However, the Bill still 
retained the specialist nature of and special interest involved in labour adjudication by 
establishing a panel of selected judges to hear labour matters. The selection of these 
would be done by a committee comprising- 
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 the President and Deputy Presidents of the Supreme Court of Appeal; 
 three representatives of NEDLAC, representing business, labour and the State; 
 the Judge President; and 
 an advocate and an attorney. 
                                         
Provision was also made for the appointment to the Supreme Court of Appeal of a 
second Deputy President, who would be primarily responsible for managing labour 
appeals in the Supreme Court of Appeal. Also, all the present rules relating to the 
Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court would remain in force and applicable until 
repealed. 
 
The intended demise of the Labour Courts would somehow represent a sorry state of 
affairs in labour law circles and a failure of a seemingly well designed experiment by the 
lawmakers in the democratic dispensation. However, there was also a positive side to 
the Superior Courts Bill of 2003. Since there would be only one court of appeal (the 
SCA), the new court structure could avoid the problem that exists at present whereby 
the LAC and SCA find themselves developing inconsistent jurisprudence on the same 
issues. At the High Court level, the fact that litigants would have the right to institute 
labour actions in all the divisions of the High Court means that access to justice could 
have been enhanced. Another advantage of that intended structure is that trade union 
officials and employer associations would have been allowed to retain their right to 
represent their respective bodies in the High Court on labour matters. It is also believed 
that the arrangement under the 2003 Bill could possibly make more efficient use of the 
labour law resources on the bench, because it was likely to involve many of the present 
High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal judges who have the necessary expertise but 
whose roles would have been limited to acting occasionally on the LAC.293Again it is 
also believed that the structure could make appointment attractive for practitioners who 
did not wish to be nomadic members of a national court.294 
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However, the new scheme would still not have been without problems. For instance, it is 
not certain what would have happened to divisions of the High Court where there are no 
judges with necessary expertise to deal with labour matters. That could possibly have 
lead to a situation where a single judge in a particular division could institute a fiefdom 
with regard to all matters in that particular division, paying no attention to the importance 
of creating precedent, thus aggravating unwarranted and costly appeals.295 
 
There is also a view that the proposed re-organization of the Labour Courts under the 
2003 Bill was in contrast to the aims sought to be achieved by the creation of a 
specialist court by the LRA.296 It also seemed to appear to move in a direction opposite 
to that taken by other disciplines, where the move is towards, rather than away from 
specialised courts.297 It is also proper to bear in mind that the Labour Court, unlike the 
High Courts, enjoys national jurisdiction and one cannot help but imagine the 
uncertainty and confusion that can arise in collective bargaining matters where, for 
instance, a strike interdict is obtained in the South Gauteng High Court. It is uncertain 
whether the national union members in other provinces would still be free to strike or 
whether the employer would have to apply for interdicts in the High Courts of other 
provinces.298 This absence of national jurisdiction would still lead to the very problem 
that the Bill sought to curb- forum shopping. The employers and trade unions would still 
have the opportunity to shop around and move towards the Court that is likely to decide 
in their favour. 
 
One of the potential failures of the 2003 Bill was its silence on the issue of the backlogs 
facing the Labour Court. It was predicted that even if labour courts were to be integrated 
into the High Court system as was proposed, the problem of delays, backlogs and 
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packed court rolls would still not have diminished.299 The High Court is still faced with 
the same problem and as a result, it has always been recommended that one of the 
ways to curb this problem is to strengthen the office of the registrar of the labour courts-
whether or not they are incorporated into the High Court.300   
 
The Superior Courts Bill appeared to be a well-planned document and from it a more 
developed regime of labour could hopefully emerge. However, the Bill, with all its good 
intentions, was brought to halt when the Superior Courts Bill 7 of 2011 was introduced. 
The    
Memorandum on the objects of the 2011 Bill expressly states that: 
 
3.3 Following the elections in 2009, the Superior Courts Bill was allowed to lapse, 
paving the way for the introduction of the new, revised Constitution Seventeenth 
Amendment Bill, and a new Superior Courts Bill 2011, in Parliament. Both Bills 
result from further consultation with, particularly, the judiciary. Draft versions of 
both Bills have also been published in Gazette No. 33216 of 21 may 2010 for 
public comment. 
 
Schedule 2 to the Bill further provides as follows: 
1. Amendment of section 151 by substitution for subsection (2) of the following 
subsection: 
“(2) The Labour Court is a superior court that has authority, inherent powers and 
standing, in relation to matters under its jurisdiction, equal to that which a court of 
a [provincial division] Division of the [Supreme Court] High Court of South 
Africa has in relation to matters under its jurisdiction.”  
 
The position under the 2011 Bill points towards the retention of the Labour Court system 
and endorses its authority vis-a-vis the High Court System.  Although there is still some 
merit in the position represented by the 2011 Bill of retaining the Labour Courts under 
                                               





the circumstances, I still agree with Van Eck301 that the jurisprudence under the 2003 
Bill would still represent an “era where the principles regulating common law contract of 
employment, the notions of fairness as developed by the Industrial and Labour Courts, 
and administrative law and constitutional law principles, will all be stirred into one 
melting pot.” 
 
4.2.2 Lessons from case law 
 
In conclusion one can postulate that the judgments in Chirwa and Gcaba have, to some 
extent, addressed the tension that existed between labour law and administrative law. 
Regardless of Chirwa‟s failure to overrule Fredericks, one can conclude with certainty 
that public sector employees do not enjoy rights different from employees in other 
sectors. These employees, like all other employees, are subject to the provisions of the 
LRA unless expressly excluded by the law. With regard to Section 157 of the LRA, 
various views have been advanced by the courts. In particular subsection 2 has been at 
the centre of interpretative battle between our courts. While some courts were calling for 
the purposive interpretation of Section 157(2), some suggested a contextual meaning to 
be given and for some, the literal meaning of the words should be decisive. I submit 
though that the deletion of Section 157(2) from the LRA is the best possible solution we 
can have to end this conflict.  
 
Coupled with the re-organisation of the Labour Courts under the Superior Courts Bill of 
2003, this repeal of Section 157(2) could also curb jurisdictional problems that emanate 
from strike action. These proposed solutions might also eliminate problems relating to 
compensation, because the employees‟ choice of forum will be limited. The High Court 
will be able to swiftly move labour matters brought to them (with hope of higher 
compensation) to the labour division. 
It is only the conflict between common law and labour law that is still lingering in the 
courts. The judgements of our courts still created uncertainties in this regard. The fact 
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that an employment contract, like any other contract, can still be enforced in the High 
Court inhibits the development of a coherent system of labour law. The appointment of 
judges with knowledge, experience and expertise in labour law will improve the uneasy 
relationship that still exists between labour law and common law.302 Despite resource 
and backlog problems discussed above, the incorporation of the Labour Courts into the 
High Court‟s system under the Superior Courts Bill would mean that the development of 
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